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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 5
NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
In this paper, we analyse the phenomenon of financial pyramids, or Ponzi
games, paying special attention to its application to transitional econo-
mies. A financial pyramid is a firm which offers extremely attractive inter-
est on private deposits, sustaining its credibility by paying the promised
interest to initial debtholders with money brought in by late-comers. Be-
cause the interest payment is many times higher than the market rate,
the pyramid is ultimately doomed to collapse, leaving ruined its current
investors. This sort of "business" has been, of course, prohibited in de-
veloped countries since the early 1920s; somewhat surprisingly it
emerged in the mid-1990s in a number of emerging market economies,
especially in Central Europe and the former USSR. Because of the insti-
tutional vacuum caused by the changing economic and political system,
no efficient barriers were put up against such pyramids. As a result, in
Russia alone about US$ 15 billion was stolen out of the pockets of some
20 million people.
But even besides institutional issues, this phenomenon is puzzling from a
purely economic viewpoint: how could millions of individuals (conceived
in economic theory as rational agents) come to an apparently irrational
decision to invest in such a risky firm? This collective madness is indeed
hard to explain if one stands within the conventional paradigm of sub-
stantive rationality. However, public interest in these pyramids can be ra-
tionalized using a weaker version of bounded rationality (Simon, 1955;
1978). In our model we consider two types of debtholders. Sophisticated
individuals are those who know that the pyramid will eventually collapse,
but they believe they can foresee when this will happen and withdraw
their savings beforehand. Naïve individuals simply do not realize that the
pyramid is cheating and invest in it simply because other people do and
these people are observed receiving positive rewards. The behaviour of
investors of this latter type can be conveniently described by the means
and methods of evolutionary games.
We model financial pyramids as a stochastic game under incomplete in-
formation between a Ponzi firm — the intended builder of a pyramid —
and a population of heterogeneous individual investors. In a simple ex-
ample of a dynamic game with just two strategies in every stage-game,
we first formulate a simple optimal stopping condition for the firm: the
firm should keep its promises whenever the pyramid grows and defect
once and forever afterwards. Then we analyse a truncated game of the
firm against a single investor and show that this dynamic game has two
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equilibrium components, one of which invokes investment up to some
stage; moreover, these components are shown to survive most equilib-
rium refinements. This sort of game, however, is a mis-specification of
the actual interaction between the population of individuals and the firm
under incomplete information. To show that the strategy of "investing up
to some stage, and withdrawing afterwards" (we call it cautious) is erro-
neous, we first build the full types and strategies' space of the stochastic
game under incomplete information. We then prove by contradiction
that the individuals' strategy in the only equilibrium of the full-scale
Ponzi game of incomplete information consists of never investing in the
pyramid.
The pyramid phenomena is thus determined as a disequilibrium phe-
nomenon motivated by less-than-perfectly rational considerations attrib-
utable to either naive beliefs in a firm's honesty or to an improper speci-
fication of the dynamic optimization problem. The explicit game
dynamics of the population's behaviour is considered and derived from
both of the two above perspectives. Specifically, we consider evolution-
ary dynamics via the imitation of successful behaviour (Weibull, 1995),
constructed without and with advertising, and a new variant of replicator
dynamics derived from the logic of the Ponzi game. Equipped with these
dynamics, we construct and plot specific discrete-time paths of a num-
ber of investors and the amounts of money attracted by the pyramids
that are compatible with the actual experience of Russia.
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1. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
The story motivating this work is both sad and fascinating. Imagine a
newly emerged bank or financial company — call it NNN, — which with-
out a proper banking license has launched an extraordinary advertising
campaign promising extremely high (4 – 6 times the market rate) interest
on private deposits. Many individual investors recklessly deposit their
money in NNN, allowing the firm to raise its liabilities to several million
US$ within a few months. Unfortunately, it turns out shortly thereafter
that the company is unable to pay the promised interest, or to return its
debt. This is of little surprise. By failing to raise money by means of prof-
itable crediting activities, NNN, just as other similar firms, sustains its
credibility by repaying the interest to its initial debtholders with money
brought in by late-comers. The end of the story is as uniform as inevita-
ble: NNN eventually becomes bankrupt, its managers "disappear," and
its former creditors (nicknamed "diluted debtholders") find that the
firm's remaining assets are worth nearly nothing. In other words, its
managers have escaped with debtholders' money.
The above story of NNN is not a fairy tale nor a historical accident due to
the controversial ingenuity of Carlo Ponzi in the 1920s. It became a real-
ity of the 1990s, especially since 1994, when a large number of real fi-
nancial pyramids flourished in a number of economies in transition, such
as Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania, Armenia, Albania — to name a
few. The eventual collapse of the Ponzi schemes left several million peo-
ple diluted of their savings and had far-reaching social, economic and
political consequences, such as increasing public mistrust in the banking
sector and in public authorities, impoverishing the population, creating
social upsets and unrest, and initiating one revolution (in Albania)1. To
some extent, the current economic instability, as well as general vulner-
ability of young democracies in these countries, can be attributed to the
distressing experience of financial pyramids.
These facts warrant the need to study financial pyramids as a phenome-
non peculiar to economies in transition, for modern pyramids owe much
of their specific features to the transformational patterns of emerging
                                               
1 Our appeal to the practice of financial pyramid is motivated primarily by the case
of Russia since it is the one we are most familiar with. However, the discussion
that follows remains applicable to most other transitional economies, where
pyramids' expansion seems to be driven by essentially the same forces.
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market economies. This approach to financial pyramids should be con-
trasted with the concept of "Ponzi games" of modern macroeconomics.
In this literature, the possibility of Ponzi games is usually ruled out on the
grounds that one cannot borrow forever — the net discounted flow of
borrowings should be nonpositive at the limit.2 Closely related to this vein
of research is an extensive literature on asset/money bubbles (Blanchard
and Watson, 1982; Tirole, 1982, 1985; Weil, 1987; Rosser, 1991, Bhat-
tacharya and Lipman, 1995; Werner, 1997; Gilles and LeRoy, 1997; Fu-
kuta, 1998). The traditional rational expectations approach to bubbles
justifies their possibility as a solution to the self-confirmed expectational
difference equation, and these solutions usually emerge under particular
conditions, such as myopic expectations or dynamic inefficiency. In re-
cent years, this literature has expanded, incorporating further relaxations
of the rational expectations assumption (Bertocchi and Wang, 1995;
Goldberg and Frydman, 1996), and spreading over a broader class of
socio-cultural phenomena (Cozzi, 1998; Orlean, 1994; Bikhchandani
et al., 1992), as well as empirical (Wu, 1997; Froot and Obstfeld, 1991)
and experimental (Porter and Smith, 1995) analysis of particular bubbles,
including the experience of the recent Asian crisis (e.g., Whittaker and
Kurosawa, 1998) and Ponzi schemes in transitional economies (Bhat-
tacharya, 1999).
Our approach is somewhat different from those mentioned above. We
treat Ponzi games as games in the game-theoretic sense, but also as
"plays" or "gambles" of individual investors against a Ponzi firm, with our
primary aim to describe the experience of Ponzi games in transitional
economies. By stressing the economic character of our approach, we
explicitly leave aside ethical or legal aspects of Ponzi games, as well as
their socioeconomic and political origins and consequences. At the same
time, the dynamics of the social interactions of individual investors, their
"herd behaviour" (Banerjee, 1992), cannot be completely neglected
even in an economic analysis of this phenomenon.3 Indeed, their behav-
iour appears to be a sort of "collective madness" with respect to issues
pertinent to their own wealth, whereas their behaviour should have been
rational! We consider two possible rationalizations of this seemingly irra-
tional behaviour, which arise as substantively rational behaviour along the
conventional Bayesian lines and boundedly rational behaviour within the
frame of evolutionary games.
                                               
2 King and Ferguson, 1993; O'Konnell and Zeldes, 1988, Forslid, 1998 are a few
examples of the relaxation of this principle, based on different premises.
3 Moreover, even some of these forms of apparent "madness" may have rationa-
listic roots (Bikhchandani e.a., 1992).
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More fundamentally, we trust that the ultimate cause of the massive ex-
pansion of the Ponzi schemes lies in the peculiarities of social and insti-
tutional transformation. This massive expansion resulted in significant
mental shocks for the citizens of the countries in transition. Imagine
someone with 20 – 30 – 50 years of planned economy experience, living
now under drastically changed rules for everyday economic activities,4
complemented by a jump in prices and massive impoverishment. Not
surprisingly, many people felt quite uncomfortable in the new, unsecured
circumstances, struggling simultaneously to survive to the extent of their
abilities and understanding. Participation in the financial market games
seemed one such survival strategy: at first glance it looked like an easy
way to maintain one's living standard, where the Ponzi firm provides a
substitute for the government as an "insurer" of individual welfare. Since
the first investors seemingly succeeded, more and more people were
about to find out that the idea was not bad at all — up to the moment
where the pyramid's collapse made clear the fallacy of such hopes.
In this paper we formalize the above considerations in terms of a sto-
chastic game and make some analytical conclusions. More detailed
analysis of the origins of financial pyramids and markets in transitional
economies is left for future research. The main analytical framework of
discrete-time stochastic Ponzi games is developed in the next section. In
Section 3 we build a parametric model of the Ponzi game and define the
optimum strategy of the firm. In Section 4 we introduce two different
sorts of individuals that we label as naive and sophisticated. Our experi-
ence suggests that such separation is meaningful from a practical view-
point, which warrants the use of different approaches when modelling
their behaviour. In Section 4 we argue that sophisticated strategies are
fallacious; this section contains the main equilibrium results about the
Ponzi games. In the Appendix, we built the general types space for the
stochastic game of incomplete information, concluding with a simple ar-
gument that shows that the only equilibrium of this game is the trivial
one, in which the pyramid does not grow at all. This conclusion permits
us to characterize the development of Ponzi schemes as a disequilibrium
phenomenon, which nevertheless has its rationalistic origins. The dy-
namics of the pyramid's growth for both naive and sophisticated indi-
viduals is developed in Section 5; the next section contains the results of
the numerical simulations and several possible extensions of the basic
dynamics. Conclusions and implications of the model are discussed in
the last section.
                                               
4 In the early 1990s, some elderly people were really afraid of and furious at see-
ing identical loafs of bread sold in different shops at different prices!
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2. PONZI GAME: GENERAL SETUP
From a microeconomic perspective, it is natural to view the Ponzi game
as a stochastic game, an approach which was introduced by Shapley
(1953) for the zero-sum case and by Sobel (1971) for general noncoop-
erative games. These games are "truly dynamic" in the sense that the
environment in which rational players make their decisions evolves as a
function of the players' past decisions. This is exactly what happens in
the case of financial pyramids. One player (the Ponzi firm) decides
whether to stay in business or to escape with debtholders' money condi-
tional upon the amount the debtholders brought to its premises (and
upon what they are expected to bring in the future). This decision of the
firm determines the investors' payoffs. Somewhat more formally, a sto-
chastic Ponzi game Γ is a discrete-time sequence γt, t = 0, 1, 2, ...,
where each γt ∈ {Γ1, ..., Γs, ..., ΓS} is one of a finite set of possible
games played at time period t, where the game to be played in period t
depends, in general, on the entire history of the players' decisions. Such
decisions are made anew by all individuals and the firm in every period t,
so that every Γs is a nonzero-sum,5 non-cooperative, simultaneous move
game of all potential individual investors and the Ponzi firm. The set S is
sometimes called state space (Sobel, 1971); since the state s at period t
corresponds uniquely to the game Γs to be played at that time period,
each γt = Γs is also called a stage-game.
The stochastic Ponzi game Γ is defined by a septuple {N+1, S, Q, γ0, u,
ρ, µ}, where the first six elements characterize a complete information
game where all players know the payoffs of each other and observe the
histories of past plays at every t. More specifically,
1. N + 1 are players indexed by ?, of which the first N are prospective in-
dividual investors, and the last one is the Ponzi firm. Throughout this pa-
per we consider the case where a large population of N private individu-
als (N < ∞) who, acting independently from each other, play against a
single financial company. This latter is somewhat loosely called a "firm,"
and which is the intended pyramid builder, undertaking no other activities
apart from raising money in order to steal it.
2. S is the state space which uniquely determines a simultaneous-move
stage game Γs for every time period. Assumption |S| < ∞ is natural in
                                               
5 The variant we construct below is a nonzero-sum game whose payoff structure
emphasizes changes in players' wealth rather than their total wealth position. It is
possible (though less convenient for our purposes) to redefine individuals' payoffs
to obtain a zero-sum variant.
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the present context since the set of players is finite, as is (see below)
the set of strategies and payoffs (possible amounts of money attracted
by the firm).
3. ?? QQ
N 1+Π=  is the set of all combinations of players' strategies. The
set of strategies of player ?, denoted by Q? , is fixed for every player and
every Γs; without loss of substance we limit discussion to the case
|Q?| = 2. Of the first N players (individuals), every one at any moment
of time can choose either an I-strategy, i.e., to Invest in the firm, or a W-
strategy, i.e., to Withhold from such investment — formally, Q? = {I, W}
for ? = 1, ..., N. The last player — the firm — can either Cooperate with
investors by paying the promised interest and the principal amount upon
request, or Defect,6 which is tantamount to the pyramid's collapse —
thus, Q?={C,D} for ? = N + 1. Since the set N of individuals is finite, as is
the strategies' space, the total number of strategies' profiles is finite7 as
well. A typical profile of the set Q is denoted by q; subscript t is applied
when we need to emphasize the time period. In what follows, we
use lowercase Latin letters q and p to indicate strategies' profiles; sub-
scripts ?, N or N + 1 always refer to players, and all other subscripts for
q and p refer to probabilistic weights attached to pure strategies in
mixed strategies' profiles. These uses should be clear from the context;
for example, qi stands for the probability of playing pure strategy i or,
isomorphically, for the proportion of individuals in the population playing
strategy i. Pure strategy i of player ? is written as ei?, pure strategy of the
population as ei.
4. γ0 is the initial stage game. We have to suppose that the firm has
some initial capital endowment and that at least some individuals play I
at this initial stage, leaving aside possible reasons for such an initial de-
cision.
5. u = {u?} is a vector of individual payoffs for all ?. In view of the se-
quential nature of the problem, we suppose that the payoff of every
player for the whole game Γ is given by the stage-additive utility func-
                                               
6 We do not need to make a formal distinction between the "forced collapse" of
the Ponzi scheme which has not been expected by the firm, and a "managed" or
"voluntary" one, when the firm knew it will happen and has prepared to get out of
the situation in advance. If the Ponzi firm behaves optimally (and we are inter-
ested in the case when it does), the only difference between the two cases will be
its last period's payoff; there is no difference in the dynamics of the pyramid's
growth.
7 More specifically, it is of cardinality 2N+1, which is still a very large number, for N
easily amounts to several million people.
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)(?? , where δ is the (fixed) discount factor, and us? (.)
is the utility received by the player ? in the stage-game s, which depends
on the stage profile qt. Every stage-game Γs can then be viewed as a tri-
ple {N + 1, Q, us?}. Unless explicitly stated otherwise, we limit our atten-
tion to the utility functions us? (.) that are continuous and linear in their
outcomes, i.e. we shall be dealing with risk-neutral (expected value
maximizing) players; the generalizations of our results to the case of
nonlinear utility functions are straightforward. It is worth emphasizing that
players' payoffs depend on the state and the strategies' profile, but not
on time: all players receive the same (undiscounted) payoff whenever
profile q is played in  state s. Accordingly, players' strategies are
'closed-loop' — they depend on the actual state achieved at any moment
t, but, in general, not on t alone. Without loss of substance we limit our
attention to the case when payoffs of all individuals are the same, while
payoffs for the firm differ as a function of the number of individuals who
have invested in it. Recalling that |N| < ∞ and that the firm undertakes
no investment, it immediately follows that the pyramid is doomed to col-
lapse whenever the inflow of new deposits becomes too weak to cover
the increasing debt payments. This latter fact also implies another im-
portant feature: the Ponzi game is terminating, i.e. the last stage T is
reached in finite time. This implies that the states Γs cannot form infinite
cycles: essentially, the game Γ is a (non-recurrent) sequence of stage
games which ends with the firm's defection.
6. ρs's, t [Γs, t+1|Γs', t, qt] is the transition function defined for t ≥ 1 that
maps any state s' that holds at t to state s at t + 1, provided profile qt
was played at t; and similarly for every t. Consistency of this definition for
the game Γ implies that further restrictions are to be imposed on this
function, which shall be stated in due course. Sequences of profiles
ht = {q0, q1, q2, ..., qt–1} defined inductively for t = 1, 2, ... and corre-
sponding to all possible profiles played at stages 0, 1, 2, ... with transi-
tions given by ρ(.) are called histories of plays at t (we usually omit the
state index s because set Q is the same for all s). The history h0 = ∅ is
called empty history; the set of all possible histories of length t is
Ht = [Qs]t for all t ≤ T < ∞, and the set of all histories of game Γ is
?
∞
=
=
0t
tHH . In stochastic games it is customary to assume that the history
of moves prior to t is "summarized" by the state at period t – 1, which is
a manifestation of the Markov property. With this property, finiteness of
S, and exogeneously given γ0, the evolution of states via ρ(.) can always
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be defined, and H is measurable even in the "classical" sense. It may
also be noticed that the set of all sequences {ht} forms a nondecreasing
sequence of algebras for every t.
Several possible evolution scenarios given by ρ(.) can be considered.
The first one is deterministic, with transition probabilities degenerate for
all s', i.e.
ρs's, t [Γs, t+1|Γs', t, qt] = 1, if state s is the immediate successor of
state s', given that profile q is played
at t ;
ρs's, t [Γs, t+1|Γs', t, qt] = 0 otherwise.
In this case, the evolution of states is given by a deterministic function of
the current state and strategies profile, which takes place in the com-
plete information case. If information is incomplete, stochastic evolution
with nondegenerate ρ will be needed, where each state-profile combina-
tion may have more than one immediate successor. Finally, in both de-
terministic and stochastic cases we may consider evolutions with noise
that are conceptually different. There, the transition function assumes
the form ρs's, t [Γs, t+1|Γs', t, qt, zt] where the last variable zt is a stochas-
tic term, interpreted as unplanned and unpredictable changes, or trem-
bles of any player 1, 2, ..., N, N+1 about the component q?t – 1 of his or
her behavioural strategy, but within the same strategies space. Distinc-
tion between strategy and tremble is thus qualitative in character; to
capture it properly, a player's utility function ought be redefined as
us? (qt, zt) for dynamics with noise. Additional (measurability) issues
would naturally arise in these stochastic settings; however, throughout
this paper we do not need to invoke disturbance terms, working instead
with its deterministic approximations.8
Omitting the disturbance term, the order of moves in a stochastic Ponzi
game of complete information for t = 0, 1, 2, ... would be as follows:
1. Independent of each other, players select their actions, thereby
determining a profile qt, observed by all players.
2. Payoffs us?(qt) are incurred and added to the utility functional of
every player;
3. The next state is determined according to the function ρs's,t(.).
                                               
8 Moreover, we believe that an explicit consideration of stochastic components,
while bringing unnecessary complications, would divert attention from more sub-
stantial issues pertinent to the Ponzi games.
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Total payoffs for all players linearly depend on the state s, the action
profile q, and the transition function ρ(.).
The above description is standard for any finite stochastic game, where
equilibrium existence follows from the standard application of the Brou-
wer fixed point theorem (Sobel, 1971; see also Friedman, 1989) to the
sets of players' stationary policies ψ = {ψ1, ..., ψN, ψN+1}. Such policies
are nothing more than the predetermined collections of behavioural
strategies for every Γs, one for each player. Sufficiency of analysis in
terms of such policies follows from the results of Blackwell (1965) and
Denardo (1967) which allow us to apply the standard Brouwer fixed point
theorem to the tuple of stage-additive and continuous utility functionals
of all players on a nonempty compact and convex subset of the
n-dimensional Euclidean space. Other approaches to the proof of
Markov equilibrium existence in more general settings (including infinite
time horizon and uncountable actions and state spaces) were imple-
mented by Reidel (1979), Parthasarathy (1982), Nowak (1985), Par-
thasarathy and Sinha (1989), Mertens and Parthasarathy (1991), Duffie
et al. (1994) and Chakribarti (1999), among others.
These last specifications are not exactly appropriate for the case of
Ponzi games. If the individuals knew that the game Γs = γT is to
be played next, they all would withhold at that stage, and thus the
firm would be better off stopping at T – 1. Reasoning backward in the
same way, we easily see that if the information is complete and players
behave optimally, the pyramid would not grow at all, and the only (sub-
game-perfect) equilibrium profile would have been W for all individuals
(D for the firm) for all Γs. But the pyramids did actually grow; and the
question naturally arises whether this might have resulted from rational
individual decisions under incomplete information, in contrast to the as-
sumption of complete information as stated above in this paragraph.
One of the results of this paper is that the above argument carries over
to the case of asymmetric and incomplete information, where the firm
knows which game Γs is played now (i.e. it knows its own current payoff),
while none of the individuals do. Such a situation corresponds with the
actual state of affairs, and also characterises the phenomenon of finan-
cial pyramids as resulting from boundedly rational (Simon, 1978) behav-
iour. We strongly maintain that bounded rationality is an appropriate as-
sumption, not least because game Γ is characterized by nontrivial
information flows, which are potentially confusing even for a player who
is otherwise (substantively) rational.
Intuitively, the problem of optimal strategy selection under incomplete
information can be characterized as follows. A firm's defection means it
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is no longer able (or willing) to stay in business; therefore, it happens at
stage T. By contrast, because the population of individuals is large, it is
natural to suppose that no withdrawal of any single individual alone can
force the game to end. In other words, the firm's strategy is not condi-
tional upon a single opponent's strategy, but upon that of a population; it
is the collective behaviour of these individuals that matters to the firm.
Putting it otherwise, instead of making an assumption (extremely heroic,
in our view) that the firm explicitly conditions its behaviour upon the
strategy of each and every of its N opponents, — we suggest that the
firm's strategy is based on the anticipation of the aggregate behaviour of
the population of individuals. This decision strategy is certainly feasible
and presumably has actually been used by Ponzis firms. In terms used in
optimal control literature, the firm has an imperfect state information,
that is, it conditions its decision on sufficient statistics. These statistics
constitute a family of real-valued functions defined on the set of all his-
tories which, when used to describe the state, entail no loss of expected
utility as compared to the exact description of the state. An example of
such a sufficient statistic for the firm is the aggregate history of invest-
ments available at t,
hN+1, t = {n0, n1, n2, ..., nt–1; qN+1,0, qN+1,1, qN+1,2, ..., qN+1,t–1},
i.e. a sequence of numbers nt of I-strategists at each time period, as
these are observed by the firm, together with the firm's own past strate-
gies.9 Henceforth we suppose that such observations are correct at any
time.
The case of individuals is different in two respects. First, while observing
the full history of the firm's past plays, no individual can observe the
firm's payoffs at any stage of the game (violation of this requirement
would endow the individual with insider information, in which case he or
she is hardly different from the Ponzi firm manager). Second, individuals
make their decisions independently of each other. It follows that in a si-
multaneous-move stage game, no individual is certain which of the
games Γs is played at stage t. Under these conditions, the individual's
task is to select an optimal strategy for each t = 0, 1, 2, ..., T, given his
or her expectations about profile qt selected by the population of indi-
viduals10 at t; and his or her probabilistic beliefs about the firm's type. In
                                               
9 Use of similar notation — ht for history and h?t for information of player ? at t, —
should not be confusing, but stresses the generic unity of both notions.
10 Strictly speaking, a population profile depends on the strategy of every individ-
ual; however, an individual's contribution is negligible in a sufficiently large popu-
lation. This simplification (customary in population games) is used henceforth
without special notice.
FINANCIAL PYRAMIDS IN TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES16
terms used in optimal control literature, individuals also have to make a
rational decision under imperfect state information, which may be repre-
sented by the (observable) information vector h?t ={q?0, q?1, q?2, ..., q?t–1;
qN+1,0, qN+1,1, qN+1,2, ..., qN+1,t–1; ζ0, ζ1, ζ2, ..., ζt–1}. Here, all q? and all
qN+1 are, respectively, this individual and the firm's moves in periods
0, 1, ..., t–1, and ζ is a (possibly null) vector of other relevant observa-
tions for the same periods, such as the strategies of a sample of other
individuals in games γ0 ... γt–1. This vector h?t plays the role of an individ-
ual's sufficient statistic which, symptomatically, need not coincide with
the sufficient statistic used by the firm. It follows that individuals are ig-
norant not only about Γs to be played at t, but also about the firm's be-
liefs at that stage, which can be estimated at most probabilistically.
Equipped with these definitions, we may complete the description of the
Ponzi game under incomplete information by introducing its last compo-
nent:
7. µ = {µ?} is the set of players' probability measures over the state
space S (physical uncertainty) and other payoff-relevant parameters
of the game, such as players' beliefs about the strategies of other play-
ers. Although S itself is finite, this measure is not trivial because of the
belief component, which shall be explicitly discussed in Section 4.
Clearly, since the firm knows perfectly its payoffs at every t, the marginal
distribution of µN+1,t on the state space S is degenerate for all t —
µN+1,t (st|hN+1,t) = 1 if s is the game to be played at t, 0 otherwise. By
contrast, every individual can at most probabilistically specify the game
Γs to be played at any t (as well as the beliefs and strategies of other N
players at that stage). Accordingly, marginal measures µ?t on S are non-
degenerate, µ?t (st|h?t) < 1, ∀s and ∑µ
s
t? (st|h?t) = 1.
This definition implies that the stochastic Ponzi game is a game of per-
fect recall and of incomplete information. The timing of this game, be-
ginning from γ0, is as follows:
1. Nature's initial move determines the firm's possible payoffs for the
initial stage-game γ0;
2. Nature reveals the true initial state to the firm but not to the indi-
viduals;
3. The firm, on the basis of its sufficient statistics, chooses the strat-
egy for the current period;
4. Individuals, without observing the firm's type or its last move,
choose an optimal strategy given their beliefs and conditional upon
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their information vectors. The resulting profile is observed by all
players.
5. Payoffs us? (qt) are incurred, discounted and added to the utility
functional of every player;
6. The next state is determined according to the function ρs's, t(.) and
is revealed to the firm but not to individuals.
7. Stages 3–6 above are repeated for all subsequent periods up to T.
Game-tree representation of such a game is prohibitively complicated.
To get some idea of its complexity, a simplified extensive-form repre-
sentation for a single stage game Γs is given in Fig. 1 for a particular
case of complete but imperfect information, where none of the players
observes the moves of the others while making their own. The multi-
stage variant of this tree slightly resembles the centipede game: a
growing pyramid will evolve in the next period unless one player (the
firm) drops by defecting.
Individual N
...
→        CollapseContinue        ←
N times
Individual 2
Individual 1
C
I W WI
D
Firm
I
:
:
:
:
:
:
W
I W
I W
I W
Fig. 1. Stage-game representation in extensive form (complete but
imperfect information).
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The incomplete and imperfect information case is more complicated; for
this case, we are unaware of any general result of equilibrium existence.
Fortunately, the specific case of the Ponzi game makes possible its
complete equilibrium analysis, which shall be provided in Section 4. Be-
fore moving on to this analysis, we want to stress again the importance
of the independent decision-making, which is made explicit by Fig. 1.
This fact allows us to think of every stage-game Γs as of N separate
games played at every stage, where a single firm plays the same strat-
egy in every "board" against N independently acting individuals, and
each of these N games, in turn, may be thought of as a two-player si-
multaneous-move game of the firm against a single individual. This last
perspective is incomplete but is of some importance for it might well ap-
pear appropriate to some investors.
3. PONZI GAME: PARAMETRIC EXAMPLE
AND STRATEGY OF THE FIRM
In this section we complete our description of the Ponzi game by for-
malizing the verbal considerations and assumptions made above. Con-
sider a game involving a population of individuals (actual and potential
investors, who may or may not know the firm's intentions) against a sin-
gle firm — an intended builder of a financial pyramid. This characteristic
means that the firm's aim is to accumulate as much money as it can and
escape with this money at the moment in time when this amount will be
at its maximum (with some abuse of notation, we call this accumulated
amount capital, denoted by kt). The Ponzi game Γ is a sequence of
stage-games, and in each of these, the Ponzi firm, which must obviously
start by Cooperating, has two strategic choices. First, it can continue to
cooperate (C) with the public (by paying the promised interest rate on
every current investor's deposits and returning deposits to those who
want to Withhold). Alternatively, it can Defect (D), in which case it pays
no interest, and escapes with the debtholders' cash deposits. Since D is
tantamount to the end of the game, this choice of strategy means that
the firm escapes with all its current capital short of a fixed bequest B.
The amount B may be understood as the value of its fixed assets and/or
real option for future growth, which is very likely to be low anyway, espe-
cially in an economy characterized by poor prospects for normal busi-
ness activities.
In turn, individuals acting independently can either invest in the firm or
withhold from investing. These decisions are made anew at every stage
of the game. The shares of individuals playing I or W or, equivalently,
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probabilities that a randomly selected individual will play these strategies
at any t, are denoted by qI and qW = (1 – qI), respectively. As argued,
any defection on part of the firm creates strong disincentives to invest. It
is common knowledge that once the firm defects, it will never return to
fair business activities. We shall refer to this property as responsiveness.
In contrast, the decision to invest may be caused by different factors, the
most obvious of which are interest rates. In the Russian pyramids of
1994, these were atypically high, easily reaching 20 to 40% per month,
given that the "safe banks" or market rates hardly exceeded 5 to 10%,
and the monthly rate of inflation amounted to some 20%. Thus, place-
ment of one's savings in the highly rewarding firm might have been a
way to save one's money, and even improve one's well-being in real
terms. This strategy is certainly rationalizeable in the game-theoretic
sense, but also from the viewpoint of any potential investor free of
money illusion. Since real savings were not the only motive for investing
in the pyramid, by simplifying matters, we commonly set the discount
rate to 1. We normalize the market interest rates to 0, and use interest
rate d, which is fixed throughout the pyramid's existence and is a strictly
positive real number equal to the difference between the value promised
by the pyramid and the market interest rate. (Of course d < 1, and per-
haps significantly so, for otherwise potential investors will not take the
offer seriously at the very outset.) Finally, for technical reasons the
population of individuals is assumed to be sufficiently large to appeal to
the Law of Large Numbers (LLN). This in particular allows us to represent
individual deposits by their average amount, denoted by M. To obtain
some of our results below, we also need to assume that some sub-
groups of individuals are also sufficiently numerous to appeal to the LLN.
Of several possible formulations we stick to the definition of payoffs in
terms of changes from the initial wealth position. This formulation is sup-
ported by most psychological findings (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
Accordingly, for every period t, the payoff to every withholder is 0 (we
assume away the existence of other profitable investment opportunities).
Investors receive Md if the firm cooperates, and –M if it defects and es-
capes (short of bankruptcy procedures, investors fail to retrieve any
share of bequest B). Each individual who invests at t adds M to kt–1 —
the value of firm's capital at the end of the previous period. For t = 1,
the amount k0 > 0 corresponds to the firm's own capital endowment). Let
nt–1 denote the number of the firm's investors (I-strategists) at the be-
ginning of period t. Those who decide to invest at t, yet were withholders
before, constitute an inflow of I-strategists, +∆ tn . Those who withhold at
t, yet were investors at t – 1, constitute an outflow of −∆ tn . The net inflow
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of I-strategists at t is then given by ∆nt = +∆ tn –
−∆ tn , and the deposit in-
crement is ∆kt = ∆ntM, which number may be positive or negative de-
pending on the relative shares of individual investors that join or quit the
pyramid. Total capital at the end of period t is given by kt–1 + ∆kt minus
interest payments (if the firm cooperates) or by bequests (if the firm
defects). For simplicity we suppose that all decisions and payments are
made within a single period; then, the exact number of individuals to
whom the firm owes the promised interest at period t is nt = nt–1 + ∆nt,
and the firm's payment due amounts to ntMd. The explicit characteristic
of the dynamics of nt is of major importance and shall be discussed in
Section 5.
The payoff-relevant information for every stage-game may be summa-
rized as a 2 × 2 bimatrix game of a single individual against the firm (Ta-
ble 1). Since the firm actually plays against the population, but not
against separate individuals, such a game shall be referred to as trun-
cated; it shall be shown in the sequel that this representation is also not
deprived of meaning.
Table 1. A "single player vs. firm" truncated game.
Individual
Firm
Invest Withhold (W)
Cooperate kt–1+∆ntM–ntMd, Md kt–1+(∆nt–1)M–(nt–1)Md, 0
Defect kt–1+∆ntM–B, –M kt–1+(∆nt–1)M–B, 0
In case of individual withholding, unity is subtracted from both the capital
increment and interest payment, because that choice of a single individ-
ual subtracts M from the firm's capital and saves Md < M to its due pay-
ments. And of course, one must not forget that in every time period, the
firm plays not one but N games as in Table 1 (see Fig. 1), and its payoffs
are conditional on the profiles in each of these games. The net inflow of
investors ∆nt thus completely determines the firm's payoff at the next
stage. Accordingly, the dynamics of ∆nt uniquely determines the se-
quence of transitions ρ(.) at every t. We emphasize again that the firm
cannot and need not base its decision on the psychology of the marginal
guy: population dynamics alone matter.
Up to stage t, the number of investors is observable by the firm, but
even though the state space is finite, it is not obvious that the firm's
probability over possible values of nt is well-defined in the case of in-
complete information. We show that this is the case in the next section.
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By now we observe that since N < ∞, the space of nt's is trivially measur-
able for all t, so that the probability measure over possible values of nt at
t – 1 can always be defined for the firm. Under these circumstances, the
payoff structure as specified above suffices to derive the rational strat-
egy for the capital-maximizing Ponzi firm that manages to build a pyra-
mid, i.e. to attract an amount of money that exceeds k0 (which is, of
course, the only case of interest). Namely, the firm should cooperate as
long as it expects the inflow of capital to exceed its outflow:
En(t)(
+∆ tn )M ≥ En(t)(ntd + 
−∆ tn )M, (1)
where expectation is taken over by the values of n(t) — the number of
I-strategists at t estimated at the end of period t – 1.11 If (1) is violated,
the firm's decision will in general depend upon the relationship between
B and En(t)(ntd + ∆n–t)M. If B < En(t)(ntd + −∆ tn )M, the opportunity cost of
defection is less than the payments due, and the firm will play D,
whereas if B ≥ En(t)(ntd +
−∆ tn )M, the current cost of operation is below
sunk costs, and it may be worth remaining in business.12 This latter case
is somewhat similar to the instance when kt ≤ k0, ∀t;  in both cases the
firm foregoes more than it gains. In such cases, we say that the pyramid
has been unsuccessful, and we shall assume them away, sticking to the
case when B < En(t)(ntd +∆n–t)M.
Collecting our assumptions, we easily obtain the following almost intuitive
result:
Proposition 1. Under the responsiveness condition, a successful pyra-
mid's optimal strategy consists of constantly cooperating whenever (1)
holds, and defecting once and forever when it expects (1) to be violated.
For the sake of completeness, we address yet another possibility: the
firm may want to continue cooperation if it expects (1) to be violated be-
cause it believes that the inflow of deposits has been only temporarily
weakened at period t, and its capital will be more than recovered in the
near future. In such cases, we shall say that the capital dynamics have
been non-monotonic, which we may also assume away. Under this con-
dition, the above proposition may be refined to the following:
                                               
11 Note in passing that since the stage-game is a simultaneous-move, the firm
must decide about defection at T in the previous period, T – 1. This may be
thought as an advanced collection of assets prior to stealing them.
12 This is, of course, a version of the standard shutdown condition in the theory of
the firm.
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Proposition 1a. Under the responsiveness condition, whenever a suc-
cessful pyramid observes a monotonically increasing inflow of deposits,
it should constantly cooperate; whenever it expects (1) to be violated for
the first time, it should defect once and forever.
The proof of both propositions is constructed as a solution to the ensu-
ing stochastic optimization problem for the optimal stopping time (e.g.,
Kushner, 1971, or Bertsekas, 1976), and is provided in the Appendix. As
follows from that proof, the optimal dynamic programming algorithm for
a successful pyramid is as follows:
Start playing C and for every stage t = 1, 2, ..., compare
max En(t){kt–1 + ∆ntM – ntMd] + Vt+1[kt + ∆nt+1M – nt+1Md]}, (2)
max En(t){kt–1+∆ntM–ntMd] – [∆nt+1M – nt+1Md]};
when the second of these expression exceeds the first one, stop the
pyramid by playing D at t + 1 = T, otherwise continue as before.
The solution of problem (2) determines a unique best-reply correspon-
dence for the firm in terms of payoff-relevant histories, i.e. without ex-
plicit appeal to the states' formulation of stochastic games. It is not diffi-
cult to see, however, that there exists a substantial morphism between
the two formulations. This is because any payoff-relevant history at any
moment t corresponds to a unique stage-game γt = Γs in terms of the
firms' payoffs. Accordingly, the firm's strategy also determines the opti-
mal stationary policy of the firm in the stochastic game Γ. Proposition 1
shows that from (2), such a strategy consists of a sequence of pure
strategies {C in t = 1, 2, ..., T – 1, D in T}, where T is free; generally,
it cannot be known a priori. The optimal stopping time thus depends
on the firm's expectations about the dynamics of nt, to which we are
moving now.
4. INDIVIDUAL STRATEGIES AND EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
A. Two kinds of individuals
Individual behaviour is perhaps the most puzzling problem of modern
Ponzi games, for their behaviour can hardly be treated as rational. One
possibility would, of course, be to say that individual participants of the
pyramids were irrational subjects of transitional economies, essentially
different from the rational subjects in the rest of the world. This viewpoint
has its proponents in both Western (Gaddy and Ickes, 1998) and East
European (Abalkin, 1997) countries; and may be backed by the observed
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differences in individual behaviour in some specific contexts (Roth et al.
1991; Slonim and Roth 1998; Cameron 1999). Nevertheless, we are
unaware of any convincing evidence which might suggest that people
with different national, cultural, historical backgrounds tend to be sys-
tematically more or less rational in their behaviour under risk, especially
when their motivation is salient enough. More specifically, a growing
body of experimental evidence implies that people's behaviour toward
risk tends to be uniform throughout the world (Kachelmeier and Shehata
1992; Belianin 1999), which clearly speaks in favour of the opposing
view. Therefore, we think that a proper explanation for individual in-
volvement in the Ponzi schemes is to be sought elsewhere, and in par-
ticular, in different perceptions of economic institutions and related be-
liefs.
Characterizing these beliefs with respect to financial pyramids, one
should immediately realize that the Ponzi game is asymmetric. The opti-
mum strategy of every individual depends on the strategy of the firm;
whereas the optimum strategy of the firm does not depend on individu-
als' behaviour, but only on the aggregate behaviour of the population of
individuals. Thus many quasi-rational individuals might have tended to
"simplify" the problem by reducing it to the game in Table 1, and sought
for an equilibrium profile in this repeated truncated game. Finally, some
talks to the Russian participants of the Ponzi games suggests that a sub-
stantial part of individual investors simply failed to understand they are
playing against thieves, being instead naive enough to believe every
word of the firm and really trusting in its ability to generate returns above
the market rate. In such cases, individuals cannot be assumed to apply
any probabilistic reasoning to assess the likelihood of the pyramid's col-
lapse.
To take into account this diversity of approaches, beliefs and strategies,
we partition the entire population into two types: naive and sophisticated,
indexed when necessary by superscripts n and s, respectively. Naive in-
dividuals were boundedly rational and 'trusting': until the pyramid had
collapsed, they uniformly believed with probability 1 that the Ponzi firm is
generally honest, or at least hardly more risky than any other bank. Their
inflow into the pyramid depends mainly upon information about the exis-
tence of such investment opportunity and the firm's reputation as a con-
tract-fulfilling institution. These factors are conveniently captured by the
mechanism of strategy selection, which is based on comparison of one's
own current payoffs to those of other subjects, resulting in the popula-
tion's gradual drift towards a more profitable strategy. In other words,
alongside the pyramid's growth, more and more people may invest just
because they know others who already did and had been rewarded. This
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last argument naturally connects their bounded rationality to the frame-
work of evolutionary game theory, as discussed in detail in the next sec-
tion.
By contrast, sophisticated investors acting independently are substan-
tively rational in the sense of Simon (1955; 1978) they maximize ex-
pected utility, given their current beliefs about their opponent's strategy,
and these beliefs are updated according to Bayes rule. Unlike naive in-
vestors, they have heterogeneous beliefs about the firm's defection
which, in addition, varies with time as captured by the appropriate prob-
ability measure. In other words, these people realize that an investment
in such a firm is very hazardous, but they have an even stronger belief
that they are smarter than the firm and will withdraw before the scheme
collapses.
B. Strategies of sophisticated individuals in a dynamic game
Under the settings specified above, the equilibrium analysis of the Ponzi
game makes sense only for substantively rational players: sophisticated
individuals and the firm. When developing this analysis, it is useful to
extend the truncated Ponzi game of the pyramid against a single individ-
ual (Table 1) to take into account incomplete information. In this case, a
single individual decides whether or not to invest in the pyramid at any
given stage t, but the firm's payoffs and actions are conditional upon the
firm's possible types. In the present context, such types correspond to
possible values of the firm's capital kt–1 and its expected net inflow of in-
vestors at period t, both of which are known to the firm but not to the in-
dividuals who have only a well-defined probability measure over these
states. Index all (possibly infinitely many) types by θ1, θ2, ..., θΘ, and
without loss of generality order these types according to their indices
from worst to best. Then, there is a type ∗θt  so that, for any type
∗+ θ>θ tt , prospects for the pyramid's growth are positive, and the firm
wants to cooperate; at any ∗− θ≤θ tt , it has to defect (we suppose that in-
difference is resolved in favour of defection). The resulting truncated
stage-game of incomplete information is presented in Table 2 (super-
scripts denote values of kt–1, ∆nt and nt specific to all possible firms'
types).
Since no single individual's contribution can alter the firm's decision to
cooperate or defect, we immediately see that either the upper (C) or
lower (D) half of firm's strategies are dominant, conditional upon (1) or,
equivalently, upon whether ∗+ θ>θ tt  or ∗− θ≤θ tt , respectively. Therefore,
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Table 2. Truncated stage-game of incomplete information.
Individual
Firm
Invest Invest
1, Cooperate MdMdnMnk ttt ,
111
1 −∆+− 0,)1()1( 111 1 MdnMnk ttt −−−∆+−
2, Cooperate MdMdnMnk ttt ,
222
1 −∆+− 0,)1()1( 222 1 MdnMnk ttt −−−∆+−
... ... ...
Θ, Cooperate MdMdnMnk ttt ,1 ΘΘΘ− −∆+ 0,)1()1(1 MdnMnk ttt −−−∆+ ΘΘΘ−
1, Defect MBMnk tt −−∆+− ,
11
1 0,)1(
11
1 BMnk tt −−∆+−
2, Defect MBMnk tt −−∆+− ,22 1 0,)1( 22 1 BMnk tt −−∆+−
... ... ...
Θ, Defect MBMnk tt −−∆+ ΘΘ− ,1 0,)1(1 BMnk tt −−∆+ ΘΘ−
this strategic-form game suggests that there are two equilibrium compo-
nents in pure strategies, conditional upon the firm's type (and none in
mixed strategies). An individual who believes that the firm will cooperate,
at the stage-game t with probability above 1/(1 + d) has to play I; and if
the firm is of type ∗+ θ>θ tt , it will continue to cooperate at t, so that any
( +θt C, I) profile constitutes an equilibrium. Another equilibrium is
( −θt D, W), which occurs when individuals do not want to mess with a
risky firm (in fact, it is risk-dominant in the sense of Harsanyi and Selten,
1988). Intuitively, the latter equilibrium can be deemed "better" than the
former; however, profiles of the (C, I) component cannot be rejected as
disequilibrium, not even on the grounds of known equilibrium refine-
ments. The following formal result proven in the Appendix stems from
the fact that if the firm's intention to defect in the stage-truncated game
at t is not common knowledge, individuals may have a range of consis-
tent beliefs about the firm's strategy, some of which may be true.
Proposition 2. In the strategic-form truncated stage game in Table 2
(as part of the Ponzi game), equilibrium components ( +θt C, I) and
( −θt D, W) will contain perfect, sequential, proper, stable and essential
equilibria whenever the firm considers it optimal to cooperate and defect,
respectively, and the individual attaches sufficiently high probability to
these events.
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This proposition seemingly justifies a possible extension of the ( +θt C, I)
profile program to the full Ponzi game, as long as an individual's uncer-
tainty about the likelihood of defection at t is captured in a "proper"
manner. Arguments of that sort might be (and probably actually were)
advanced by some sophisticated individuals to back the following cau-
tious strategy: Invest at early stage, but be 'sufficiently prudent', and
withhold before the expected collapse of the pyramid. In other words, a
sophisticated investor with a sufficiently high discount factor tries to
solve his own stochastic control problem in a truncated Ponzi game as
given by a sequence of stage-games from Table 2.
∑ ∑∫
τ τ θ
τ
τ δ=?u e?τ u?τ(e?τ, eN+1,τ, θτ)µ(dθτ) (3)
As long as the firm's intention to defect comes together with the individ-
ual's intention to stop, profile "(C, I) at every stage prior to T and (D, W)
at T" in this truncated game would "look like" an equilibrium which shall
also be sequential, perfect, subgame perfect and Markov perfect.
However appealing and successful in practice, this argument is wrong
for the following reason. The cautious strategy is arguably optimal in an
extension of a truncated game; however, when the individual plays
against the firm, the firm is not playing against this individual alone, but
against the population. But the population's "strategy" is not observable
by any single individual; it can be at most probabilistically evaluated via
some statistic.13 Such probability space is explicitly constructed in the
Appendix; assuming this probability space exists, the supposed cautious
strategy should maximize not the short-term payoff (3) over some τ ⊂ T,
but payoff
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where Gn(n,n–1) is defined inductively as ∫
θ
−
θµθ )|,(),( 1nnsn hsdquq ???  for all
n = 1, 2, ..., T. In equation (4), every q?t(ht) is an Ht × S — measurable
                                               
13 It is worth mentioning that the calculation of this probability, if possible, is far
from being trivial!
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function whose range is a probability distribution over one and the same
set of actions at t, namely, {I, W}. Policies ψ?, which maximize this pay-
off, constitute the true best response in the Ponzi game. Is it possible to
find some nontrivial profile compatible with the cautious strategy? A little
reasoning suggests the negative answer to that question; however, be-
fore reaching this conclusion we need first to show that the mere maxi-
mization problem in (4) is appropriately formulated. This formulation is
provided in the next subsection.
We conclude the present discussion by noticing that those individuals
who were successful in playing the cautious strategy were in fact not-so-
wise or virtuous. Not wise, because the cautious solution of a dynamic
optimization problem for optimal stopping time has to be found by maxi-
mizing expected gain; it does not provide an efficient algorithm to locate
the last period of the pyramid's existence. Accordingly, those who suc-
ceeded in playing this strategy did so only by luck, unless they were in-
siders of the Ponzi firm, in which case they are hardly distinguishable
from its managers. And they were not virtuous because their wealth in-
creased at the expense of other fellow investors who happened to invest
later. In that sense, these cautious individuals themselves played the role
of "little Ponzis"!
C. Equilibrium analysis of the Ponzi game
The considerations provided above led to the following proposition,
which is stated in its full generality:
Proposition 3. The only equilibrium of the Ponzi game Γ under incom-
plete information and the above specifications is a trivial one: (D, W) at
every stage.
Proof of that proposition requires some further elaboration, beginning
with a definition of the equilibrium concept for the stochastic Ponzi game
Γ of incomplete information. It is formulated below in standard (Baye-
sian) terms, as the mutual best response of players' behavioural strate-
gies conditional upon their respective types. For every history ht,
t = 0, 1, 2, ... let µ?t (θ–?|θ?, h?t) be the (joint) subjective probability of
player ? at t that his N opponents at t are of types θ–? given that he is
of type θ? himself and given h?t, his or her information vector at t.
Let v?t(ψ?) ∑
+=τ
τδ=
T
t 1
E[u?(q?τ, θ, s, h?τ)] be player ?'s expected continuation
payoff for the stages that follow t if he adopts policy ψ?. The set of sta-
tionary policies {ψ?} for every player ? has a very simple structure; since
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mixed strategies are ruled out, it is a |2S|-set of all combinations of I
and W (for individuals) or C and D (for the firm). Therefore, v?t(ψ?) for
every ψ? is defined as long as both subjective probabilities µ?τ(θ–?|θ?, h?τ)
are properly defined for all τ = t + 1, t + 2, ..., T, and transition prob-
abilities ρs's, t[Γs, t+1|Γs', t, qt] are properly defined for all t. This last
condition is again easily met in the Ponzi game. To every possible value
of k0 (initial capital of the firm) corresponds a finite set of cardinality
2N whose points are possible profiles qt. Because this last set is
trivially measurable, and the game is over after a finite number of steps,
the transition probability is uniquely defined for every k0 and history ht,
and game Γs, t+1 is uniquely determined by Γs, t and profile qt played at
stage t.
For every player ? and every t = 0, 1, ... pure strategies are e?t = {I, W} if
? = 1, 2, ..., N, and {C, D} if ? = N + 1. For respective cases, let q–?t be
the profile of other players' strategies. Equilibrium policy ψ? is a collec-
tion of e?t's, one for every stage-game, which for every player of type θ?
maximizes
∫
−
θ
=ψ
?
?? tlt uV )( [e?t, q–?t, s|θ, h?t] µ?t(dθ–?, s|θ?,h?t) +
+∑ρ
'
,'
s
tss µ?τ(θ–?, s|θ?, h?τ)v?t(ψ?), (5)
and an equilibrium payoff is the maximized sum of stage utilities,
V?T(ψ?) =∑
=
T
t
tV
0
? .
To establish that an equilibrium is (non)existent, it remains to show that
definition (5) is consistent by showing the existence of players' types.
Following Harsanyi (1967), every player in the game Γ is characterized by
a vector "representing certain physical, social and psychological attrib-
utes of player ? himself in that it summarizes some crucial parameters of
player ?'s own payoff function u? as well as the main parameters of his
beliefs about his social and physical environment. Each player is as-
sumed to know his own actual type but to be in general ignorant about
the other players' actual types." (Harsanyi, 1967, p.171) In other words,
player's type θ? should incorporate his or her beliefs not only about pos-
sible state s ∈ S, but also about the types of all players. For static games
of incomplete information such space has been constructed by Mertens
and Zamir (1985) and Brandenburger and Dekel (1993) who interpreted
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each Θ? in the probabilistic (Bayesian) sense, which in particular implies
that every player knows all her opponents to be Bayesians, and to which
we adhere, too.14 The case of the dynamic game is more complicated
because players' uncertainty extends over future states, that is, over the
continuation  game, and players may well disagree in their beliefs about
this continuation game (by having different beliefs as to which game Γs is
played at stages t, t + 1, ...). It turns out, however, that the analysis is
greatly simplified by the ability to observe the firm's move, and we shall
construct a sequence of universal belief spaces which are obtainable
for every stage t + 1 from the analogous space at t in a natural way. Re-
sulting spaces shall still be "rich enough" to include all possible future
paths and all future beliefs of all players. These beliefs are adjustable in
a Bayesian manner, and represent players' types. For every stage t,
such types are joint probability distributions on the following sets and
subject to following condition:
1) set 0tB  represents "physical uncertainty" about the payoffs15 of all
players in the stage-game t and its continuation game;
2) set {Θ–?t} of all possible beliefs of all other players about 0tB  and ?'s
beliefs at t;
3) player ? knows (assigns probability 1) his own actual beliefs; and
4) conditional upon his or her information, these beliefs are updated
according to the Bayes rule at every stage t.
The last two are consistency conditions, while the first two define the
universal belief space Ωt = 0tB × (Θ?t)N+1 with typical element ωt, where
every Θ?t is the set of all probability distributions on 0tB × (Θ–?t)N (Carte-
sian product of 0tB ) and the space of beliefs of other players.
Proposition 4. There exists a well-defined universal belief space for
stochastic Ponzi game Γ under incomplete information.
Proof of this proposition, together with the construction of the universal
belief space is contained in the Appendix. This proof demonstrates, inter
alia, that all stage-games play a twofold role in the information structure
                                               
14 More general belief spaces may be considered as well (Epstein and Wang,
1996), but these shall not be considered here.
15 Generally, physical uncertainty should also encompass the set of possible
strategies; however, in the Ponzi game, these are simple and commonly known.
FINANCIAL PYRAMIDS IN TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES30
of game Γ. On the one hand, they remove uncertainty about each 0tB
in terms of the firm's move; on the other, they provide partial information
about the true state, paving the way to Bayesian updating. It is also
instructive to note that these hierarchies contain the possible actual
paths of some stochastic process {nt} in the probability space
(B∞, σ(B∞)), a process which also uniquely determines the values of {kt}
from any given k0.
Returning now to the players' strategies, it is worth noticing that as long
as h?t ≠ hN+1, t, all individuals and the firm will generally make use of dif-
ferent information; thus, there is no guarantee that the two inferred
posterior probabilities will match each other. In other words, we have the
next proposition.
Proposition 5. If different individuals use different vectors {ζt} as a
sampling distribution of the past history of behaviour of each other, then
no proper universal belief space can be constructed. A simple proof is
again contained in the Appendix.
This proposition further emphasizes our earlier claim that it makes no
sense to play strategically or "outguess" the firm by providing a sub-
stantial reason for its failure. If individuals will ground their strategies on
anything other than commonly known information, the stochastic process
of the pyramid's growth may not be measurable. To avoid these difficul-
ties, in what follows we have to assume a simpler sort of sampling, limit-
ing our attention to h?t = {q?t, qN+1, t} (past history of own plays and
those of the firm for the individual) and hN+1, t = {n?t, qN+1, t} (past
history of own plays and the sum statistic of the population strategy for
the firm).
However, even this specification does not restore nontrivial equilibria;
and now we are in a position to provide a simple proof of Proposition 3
by contradiction (An alternative proof is just a bit more tedious, which
makes use of the fact that the map of best-reply correspondences of all
players onto itself fails to be continuous).
Proof of proposition 3: Consider the set ψ of policies and suppose
there exists a profile of equilibrium strategies of the players, together
with the probability measures constructed in the proof of Proposition 5.
Recall first that game Γ reaches at most S alternative states with
|S| = 2N+1, any of which are related to the previous state via transition
function ρ. It follows that the firm's optimum policy ψN+1 will include de-
fection in finite time. Suppose this happens at stage T; then those indi-
viduals who withhold at T will be better than those who invest at that
5. EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS OF INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOUR 31
stage. It follows that the Nash equilibrium profile at the last stage T
(Table 2) is (D, W), and all individuals are to defect. But if so, then,
by Proposition 1 the firm would not be interested in keeping the pyramid
until T, where its payoff is certain to fall short of interest paid in period
T – 1, resulting in a cash outflow. Therefore, it will want to defect at
T – 1, but by then individuals by the same token will consider withdraw-
ing optimal at T – 1, resulting in (D, W) at that stage, too. Continuing it-
eratively back to period 0, we see that this is the only mutual best re-
sponse profile for every stage game. Q.E.D. (By backward induction the
idea of the above proof is clearly similar to the "lemons" market argu-
ment (Akerlof, 1970).
The result of equilibrium nonexistence is intuitively pretty clear; however,
the intuition behind it is not very easy to extract because of nontrivial in-
formation flows. The complexity of these flows is a potential source of
confusion; however, results of this section suggest a firm "policy ad-
vice": DO NOT PLAY PONZI GAMES!
But real people did not seem to listen to that rule; thus, their behaviour
must have been suboptimal. One reason for this suboptimality has just
been discussed — it is the erroneous belief in one's abilities to behave
optimally when you cannot. Another reason is suggested by the bounded
rationality paradigm, specified in the next section in an evolutionary
framework, where we explicitly construct a number of adaptive dynamics
compatible with the logic of Ponzi games. Both lines of explanations im-
ply that the actual growth of financial pyramids has been a disequilibrium
phenomenon motivated by equilibrium considerations.
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The above analysis was essentially Bayesian in its spirit; thus, it restricts
attention to the behaviour of sophisticated individuals. On the other
hand, it might make sense to suppose that many individuals were naive
and did not update their beliefs in a Bayesian manner (even in most in-
direct sense), using instead satisfizing strategies (Simon, 1978). It is now
proper time to proceed with an explicit description of both processes,
leading to the crucial component omitted thus far — the dynamics of in-
vestors' net inflow.
A. Naive individuals
We call naive individuals boundedly rational in the sense introduced in
Section 4, but since the use of this notion in the literature has often been
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somewhat voluntary and loose, we recapitulate our definition. First, naive
individuals are not stupid: they understand that more money is better
than less and are ready to undertake some efforts to increase their well-
being. Second, they trust the "skilful" modern managers and advertising
campaigns, and do not expect the Ponzi firm to defect at all. Then, they
are myopic: instead of "thinking of" the best reply to the firm's possible
strategy, they just compare the present yield on the strategy they are
currently playing to that of the competing one, and choose the best on
the basis of current observations only. Moreover, in choosing an optimal
strategy they are socially oriented rather than self-dependent; selecting
their strategies, they readily refer to the experience of neighbours.
Finally, in our application it also makes sense to allow the subjects to
change their strategy regardless of its current performance; e.g., depos-
its may be withdrawn from the firm for the purposes of regular or unex-
pected transactions.
The above ideas may be captured by a broad class of different learning
rules which leads to the variants of the replicator dynamics (Bjornerstedt
and Weibull, 1995; Weibull, 1995, Schlag, 1998, Borgers and Sarin,
1997, Arthur, 1993, Samuelson, 1997). All these models stipulate an in-
crease with time of the share of better-fitted strategies within the popu-
lation. Under somewhat specific, but still sufficiently general conditions,
the time evolution of the share of investors among these may be usefully
approximated16 by the equations of the replicator dynamics family (in
discrete time17), due originally to Taylor and Jonker, 1978 (see also
Maynard Smith, 1982):
∆qi = qi[u(ei, p) – u(q, p)]. (6)
where u(ei, p), as introduced earlier, is the expected payoff of an individ-
ual playing pure strategy i against an opponent from a different popula-
tion characterized by mixed strategy p. Finally, expected payoff of a
randomly selected member of the population characterized by mixed
strategy q, against an opponent playing mixed strategy p is denoted
by u(q,p). We shall also need symmetric game notation, where an indi-
vidual plays against a randomly chosen member of her own (large)
                                               
16 Coming from biological sciences (Maynard Smith, 1982), the replicator dynam-
ics (5) are often thought to be less natural in economic applications (Levine,
1997). However, recent research (Schlag, 1998; Arthur, 1996) has shown that its
flavour is more general than it might appear. Our work is along the same vein of
research, suggesting an economic application of some generalisations of the dy-
namics (5).
17 Here and below, time-dependence indices are omitted when no confusion is
likely to arise.
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population — in this case, her expected payoff shall be denoted by
u(ei, q), and the average one — u(q, q). The firm, of course, is interested
not in the share of I-strategists in the whole population, but in the num-
ber of its investors. But formally, these two quantities are isomorphic: the
number of i-strategists, denoted by ni, evolves with the proportion of
population playing strategy i, qi = ni/N, as long as the population size N
remains the same. Thus, in our case the vector of such proportions
q = [qI, 1 – qI] = [qI, qW] may be formally associated with the mixed
strategy of the population.
The replicator dynamics might appear to be an improper tool to describe
individual rationality, since this dynamics deals only with populations,
which certainly do not reason, at least in the sense in which we speak of
a single person. Such an objection, however, is not sustainable: "mixed
strategy" just means that at any moment in (discrete) time, every indi-
vidual investor plays one of two pure strategies: invest or withhold,
whichever choice is deemed better for that individual. Furthermore, the
assignment of individuals to play a particular strategy does not imply that
everyone is doomed to play this strategy once and forever. In fact, quite
the opposite is the case: individuals do have free will, and thus may (and
even should) change their strategies when the course of events and/or
their own reasoning persuades them to do so. In fact, the rationalistic
background of the replicator dynamics is yet more involved: individual
decisions are subject to evolution, belief dynamics, fashion and other
perceptions of the relative fitness of alternative behaviour strategies,
which, of course, may be very complicated. But if separate individuals in
a large population, on average, update their strategies according to
some well-defined rules, the evolution of strategists' shares within the
entire population may be either exactly described or approximated18 by
members of particular families of difference/differential equations. Addi-
tional support for this "micro-aggregation" in a form of replicator dy-
namics is in the nature of the control problem for the firm: explicit condi-
tioning of the firms' strategy upon the strategy of any single individual
becomes prohibitively difficult even when the population is relatively
small.
Below we construct a variant of the deterministic replicator dynamics in
discrete time (adapted from Weibull, 1995), which is explicitly derived
from individual adaptation strategies. Weibull calls it the replicator dy-
namics via imitation of successful behaviour.
To introduce evolutionary dynamics into the strategies of naive individu-
als, we use a symmetric auxiliary game, as presented in Table 3. This
                                               
18 This approximation, inter alia, allows us to suppress the effects of possible ran-
dom disturbances zt with no loss of substance.
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may be thought as a sort of "fictitious" play between every two stages of
the main deposit game.
Table 3. The symmetric auxiliary game.
I (Prob = qI) W(Prob = 1 – qI)
I (Prob = qI) Md, Md Md, 0
W (Prob = 1–qI) 0, Md 0, 0
In an auxiliary game, all members of a large population are originally as-
signed to play some particular strategy (I or W), the shares (and thus,
numbers) of I- and W-strategists corresponding to a population's mixed
strategy in a sequence of stage-games (as in Table 1). Although these
strategies are fixed for all N players within every period, they evolve as a
result of random "matches" with other players from the same population.
Such matches may be thought as meetings in the street, in a cafe or at a
party, in short, at any place where individuals may share their "invest-
ment strategies", revising their current strategy according to its relative
fitness comparative to that of their opponent in an auxiliary game. Spe-
cifically, we suppose that revisions of a current strategy for every mem-
ber j of the subpopulation of naive subjects follow a Poisson process with
arrival rate rj, and every individual j switches to the strategy i with the
probability ∑ =ππ
i
i
j
i
j 1, , ∀i, j (in general, both r and π can vary across
subpopulations). If these Poisson processes are statistically independent
for every player, the average per unit time review rate of current
j-strategists will have a Poisson distribution with the parameter rjqj,
where qj denotes the fraction of j-strategists in the entire population at t
(population size is normalized). Invoking a continuum approximation of
the entire population,19 this stochastic Poisson process for the
j-strategists' average may be approximated by a deterministic flow where
the average switch rate from j to i per unit time is given by ijjj rq π : the
proportion of j-strategists times the revision rate times the probability of
this switch. The (total) inflow to strategy i is ∑ π
j
i
jjj rq , whereas the (to-
                                               
19 A crucial point at which to get a meaningful approximation of the mechanism
being described is that of a sufficiently large population, which allows us to appeal
to LLN, complemented by some further technical qualifications (Borgers and Sa-
rin, 1997; Boylan, 1992, 1995).
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tal) outflow of i-strategists is given by ∑ π
j
j
iii rq ; a fraction 
i
iii rq π  reviews
strategy i and continues playing it. In discrete time, the average inflow to
the subpopulation i equals
∑ ∑ ∑ −π=π−π=π−−π−
−−π−π++π++π=−+
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In our case, there are only two strategies, I and W, where 1 – qI = qW, so
this process is simply
,)1(1 II
I
wwI
I
IIIItIt rqrqrqqq −π−+π=−+ (8)
where the first component denotes a fraction of those who were to mod-
ify their behaviour, but found current strategy (I) superior to the other
(W). The second stands for those new I-strategists, and the last one de-
notes the outflow of I-strategists to strategy W.
To obtain close-form dynamics, further simplification of (8) is needed.
We shall concentrate on a particularly compelling specification, also due
to Weibull (1995). It assumes that the revision rates are constant across
a population (set ri = 1, ∀i), but the probabilities of switching to the
strategy of randomly selected individuals depend on the relative fitness
of the two strategies. According to this rule, the current j-strategist sam-
ples at random another member of the same population, and switches to
strategy i if the player he or she meets was an i-strategist and if his or
her perceived utility of strategy i is above his or her perceived utility of
the strategy j. Maintaining that u(.) are risk-neutral utilities (payoffs from
Table 1), the perceived utilities will be denoted by u(ei, q) + ε and
u(ej, q) + η, where u(., q) are expected gains on alternative strategies,
and parameters ε and η are subject-specific random variables with
known distribution among the population, which capture particular
shapes of individual utility functions.21 A switch from j to i will then occur
                                               
20 Letting the time increment in (6) go to 0, the differential analogue of the above
process can be obtained as
∂qi/∂t = ∑ −π
j
ii
i
jjj rqrq
00 (6a)
with an accordingly adjusted review rate, i.e., 0ir = riτ, τ → 0.
21 To ensure accuracy of the following derivation, we need to assume that ex-
pected values of strategies I and W are the same for all prospective investors.
Here we need the assumption of identical beliefs for all naive individuals.
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if u(ei, q) + ε > u(ej, q) + η ⇔ η – ε < u(ei, q) – u(ej, q); expression η – ε
will also be a random variable, assumed continuously differentiable
and with known cdf F(.). Under random sampling across q, the probabil-
ity that a j-strategist will play strategy i at the next stage will then be
given by
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and similarly for all strategies. In particular for the case of Ponzi game,
the rule (8) results in
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With these functions π and constant r = 1, recalling that qW = 1 – qI, we
obtain from (8) the following dynamics for I:
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and similarly for W. Payoff-monotonicity of (11) is ensured if F(.) is
strictly increasing. A linear approximation of these dynamics is always
possible near the steady-state (Weibull, 1995); the replicator approxima-
tion may be obtained everywhere on the mixed strategies' simplex if F is
the uniform distribution given by a + b[u(ei, q) – u(ej, q)], b > 0. Under
this assumption, a version of the replicator dynamics in discrete time
may be obtained from (11) as
Iq′  = qI(1 – qI){F [u(eI, q) – u(eW, q)] – F [u(eW, q) – u(eI,q)]} =
= qI(1 – qI){(a + b[u(eI, q) – u(eW,q)] –
– a – b[u(eW, q) – u(eI, q)])} = qI{(1 – qI)bu(eI, q)–
– (1–qI)bu(eW, q) – (1 – qI)bu(eW, q) + (1–qI)bu(eI,q)} =
= qI{2bu(eI, q) – 2bu(q, q)} = 2b
n
Iq [u(eI, qn)–(qn, qn)]}, (12)
Dynamic (12) is a rescaling of replicator dynamics (6) with factor 2b.
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B. Sophisticated individuals
The model considered in the previous section dealt exclusively with naive
individuals' behaviour; but the whole population consists of sophisticated
ones as well. As discussed above, their sophistication is of little worth
however. To the extent this disequilibrium pattern took place, the dy-
namics of this subpopulation warrant a separate description. Following
our earlier notation, let the whole population N consist of Nn naive and
Ns sophisticated individuals. In what follows we shall index these respec-
tive fractions by superscripts n and s, respectively, so that the number of
sophisticated I-strategists at each time period is stn , that of naive strate-
gists is ntn , their sum is nt, and the total number of withholders at t
equals N – nt. Since N = Nn + Ns, qI = (nn + ns)/N defines the propor-
tion of I-strategists in N (the whole population, without superscript) at
any t, we also have qIs=ns/Ns, qIn=nn/Nn, and the total share of I-
strategists (with 1–qI as the total share of W-strategists) may be repre-
sented as
sn
ss
I
nn
I
I
NN
NqNq
q
+
+
= .
Unlike naive individuals, sophisticated ones are heterogeneous: they
have different beliefs as to what the firm's strategy will be in the coming
stage game. They are also substantively rational in the sense that their
subjective probability of the firm's defection is above zero and further is
nondecreasing with the time of the pyramid's existence. It may be noted
that for the sophisticated individuals, the Ponzi firm has a strong "nega-
tive" reputation, namely the individuals behave strategically against a
known-to-become-defective firm and decide to withhold depending on
the current values of their information vectors h?t, modifying their beliefs
via the Bayes rule.
For reasons of tractability we shall henceforth assume that all individuals
observe the same history h?t consisting of the firm's moves and their own
strategy, but that their beliefs differ only with respect to the initial belief
about the time when the Ponzi firm will ultimately defect. Fixing these
evolutions for the rest of the paper, any of its paths will be denotedht
(with an overbar, to distinguish it from histories h?t). Consider an arbitrary
sophisticated individual ? who in every period needs to estimate the
posterior probabilities Prob(Ct+1| th ) and Prob(Dt+1| th ). In two cases,
the beliefs of sophisticated and naive individuals coincide: ifht contains
information about the firm playing D at any time period in the past, then
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Prob(Dt+1|ht) = 1 and Prob(Ct+1|ht) = 0 for all individuals (this is of
course a paraphrase of the responsiveness condition). For any other
history, making a (reasonable) assumption that the firm's actions are
stage-independent from an individual's viewpoint, for all historiesht in-
volving t + 1 cooperations in a row, we have
Prob(Ct+1 th , 1−th , ..., 0h ) =
= Prob(Ct+1∩ th , 1−th , ...,h0)/Prob( th , 1−th , ...,h0) = µ(Ct+1) =
= (1–µ0) Prob(Dt+1 th , 1−th , ...,h0) =
= Prob(Dt+1∩ th , 1−th , ...,h0)/Prob( th , 1−th , ...,h0) = µ(Dt+1) = µ0.
These transitions describe a simple Markov process with the matrix
of transition probabilities presented in Table 4. We let [1 – µ0, µ0]
be the prior vector of probabilities and fix this stochastic matrix for
all t.
It is natural to suppose that the longer the pyramid exists, the lower is
the sophisticated I-strategist's belief that the firm will not defect in the
next period. This is given by the Markov process, stipulated by the usual
Bayesian updating: sequential multiplication of the row vector [1–µ0,µ0]
by the stochastic matrix in Table 4 puts subsequently higher posteriors
to D and subsequently lower posteriors to C. Alternatively, the same prior
vector may be multiplied by t-step transition matrices calculated via
Chapman–Kolmogorov equations, e.g., the transition probabilities matrix
after two stages is as shown in Table 5.
Table 4. Matrix of transition probabilities for the beliefs of sophisticated
individuals.
C D
C 1 – µ0 µ0
D 0 1
Table 5. Two-step matrix of transition probabilities of beliefs for sophisticated
individuals.
C D
C (1 – µ0)2 µ0(1 – µ0) + µ0
D 0 1
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Subsequent replication of the same procedure leads at the end to
Prob(D) = 1 which is an absorbing state.
Further, we let individual beliefs vary across individuals. Such heteroge-
neity can be introduced in the following simple way. In the case of finite
Ns, let ϖ0 = min(µ0) and w0 = max(µ0) be the highest (below 0.5) and
lowest (close to 0) initial subjective beliefs that the pyramid is to defect
in the next (i.e., first) period. We assume that the values of µ0 obey dis-
crete uniform distribution on the [ϖ0, w0] segment; the endpoints of this
segment will evolve with time as ϖt and wt in an obvious way. If ϖ0 — the
lowest value of µ — is arbitrarily close to 0 (corresponding to those in-
vestors who are rational in the Bayesian sense, but do not think the firm
is likely to defect at all), then ϖt — the minimum of posterior beliefs at
t — will remain close to 0, and the behaviour of the holder of such beliefs
will resemble that of naive individuals. Confidence of more sceptical
subjects will, however, erode faster, and in due time, they will decide to
withhold from now and forever. An assumption of the uniform distribution
of beliefs in (ϖt, wt), together with a continuum approximation of beliefs
and risk-neutrality, leads to the following sequence of posterior prob-
abilities for the entire class of sophisticated individuals:
Prob (Invest at stage t) = Prob[µt < d/(1 + d)] =
    = [d/(1 + d) – ϖt]/[wt – ϖt]. (13)
This expression defines the probability that an arbitrarily selected so-
phisticated individual will prefer I to W. Risk-neutrality implies that the
corresponding investment condition is given by
(1 – µt)Md – µtM > 0. (14)
An individual for whom this condition is not met will choose in favour
of W. A threshold value for this inequality depends on parameters d,
ϖt and wt, which determine the probability that an arbitrary sophisticated
I-strategist will withhold.
Another component of our construction applies to those sophisticated
individuals who were playing W because of their ignorance about the
pyramid's existence, but became aware of it along with its growth. We
formalize this possibility by supposing that in each time period, Ns/2t in-
dividuals are randomly and independently of their beliefs selected with-
out replacement from the population of all sophisticated individuals.
These selected players consider an investment prospect which they ac-
cept iff (14) happens to be satisfied for them, and those who once
checked their preferences, never return to the issue. In other words, we
assume that at period 1, Ns/2 individuals "learn" about the prospect to
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become rich by joining the pyramid. In period 2, this procedure is re-
peated for half of those who have not been subjected to it in period 1,
and so forth, so that at the limit of t → ∞, should the pyramid survive,
everyone will become aware of its existence. In that way, in each period
of time at the early stage of the pyramid's growth there will be a uniform
"injection" into the current population of I-strategists: the share of those
"checkers" who end up investing in every time period is a fraction of
Ns/2t given by (13). However, as t→∞, it will happen that d/(1 + d) < ϖt,
i.e., the least sceptical individual will not invest, and the fraction of new-
comers will become zero.22
Finally, let us specify the leakage conditions. First, since sophisticated I-
strategists are prudent, they are set to revise their beliefs at the begin-
ning of every time period. For a given individual, as long as (13) is vio-
lated, he or she immediately withholds. Conveniently, beliefs of all cur-
rent I-strategists are uniformly distributed in (ϖt, d/(1 + d)) for all t. A
fraction of such withholders among the current I-strategists for every t is
given by
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To justify this condition, observe that we need to find the share of cur-
rent I-strategists stn  for whom (14) was satisfied in period t, but is
no longer satisfied at t + 1. From (13) and the uniformity of beliefs in
[ϖt, d/(1 + d)], 
s
tn  I-strategists at t were uniformly distributed between
ϖt and d/(1 + d), while at t, ϖt+1 – ϖt of them switched to the withholding
strategy. This must be true of every consecutive quantity stn  until (13) is
satisfied for at least some of the sophisticated individuals; however, all of
them immediately withhold as long as the minimum of the admissibility
region exceeds d/(1 + d). Moreover, we want to allow sophisticated indi-
viduals to withhold for transactions without strategic purposes, irrespec-
tive of their beliefs. We assume this is a fixed fraction c of those who
would continue to invest on the grounds of their beliefs.
Suppose that some exogenous number sn1  of sophisticated individuals
happened to invest in period 0. Summarizing the above arguments,
                                               
22 We safely rule out the case w0 > d/(1 + d): if sophisticated individuals are "too
sceptical" to invest, their behaviour is immaterial for the pyramid's growth.
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the discrete-time dynamics of sophisticated I-strategists in periods
t = 1, 2, ... is given by
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The positive summation above denotes the number of those sophisti-
cated individuals who first consider investing at t and will indeed invest,
and the negative one is a leakage of I-strategists for either transaction
purposes or reasons of prudence.
C. The dynamics of pyramid's growth
Now we may explicitly combine the two dynamics — (12) for naive and
(16) for sophisticated individuals — to create a single dynamics of the
population. A relatively nice and compact picture would be obtained by
the "vertical sum" of the two dynamics, resulting in
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where, as before, nt = 
n
t
s
t nn +  with corresponding indices for quantities
related to of Nn and Ns. This picture, however, would not be correct, for
in the whole population an arbitrary naive W-strategist can meet either a
naive or a sophisticated I-strategist, and thus the probability of meeting
an I-strategist is approximately qI, their fractions in the whole population.
Accordingly, (11) is to be rewritten as
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of which further simplification is not possible. Recalling our assumption
that "beauty is in the eye of the beholder," i.e. that utilities of one's own
and alternative strategies are estimated from the assessor's personal
viewpoint, we still may rely on a linear approximation of F(.) at relatively
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low cost: it suffices to assume that the distribution of tastes is on aver-
age the same (i.e., uniform with parameters a and b) for either sophisti-
cated or naive individuals. Then (18) is rewritten as
∆qn = – nIq (1 – qI){F[u(eW, q)–u(eI, q)] +
+ (1 – nIq )qIF[u(eI, q) – u(eW, q)] =
= – nIq (1 – qI){a + b[u(eW, q) – u(eI, q)]} +
+ (1 – nIq )qI{a + b[u(eI, q) – u(eW, q)]}, (19)
which looks of course less neat than (12), resulting in an accordingly
complicated expression in place of (17):
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Dynamics (20) is referred as to basic dynamics in Section 6. While being
rather cumbersome, it still allows us the convenience of working with
deterministic dynamics instead of a stochastic one. It also serves as the
sufficient statistic for the optimal control problem of the Ponzi firm. Note,
finally, that these dynamics of population growth are completely deter-
mined by unknown parameters a, b, wt and ϖt which are directly inter-
pretable in economic terms; they correspond to the parameter vector Wt
introduced in Section 4.
6. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
AND ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS
Empirical tests of the above dynamical models are rather difficult, for no
data on the pyramid's growth are readily available. The only publicly
available information is the number of "diluted debtholders," n*, the
maximum amount of capital k*, and also the pyramid's existence time.
For instance, according to Russian media, one of the most famous Rus-
sian pyramids (Khoper-Invest, Rostov-on-Don) attracted 1500 billion
roubles from some 2.5 million private investors; another one (Russian
House Selenga, Volgograd) — 2800 billion roubles. As shown in this sec-
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tion, these numbers are compatible with the numerical estimations of
dynamics (20) and its extensions.
A. Basic dynamics
We used dynamics (20) to simulate pyramid growth with different values
of 12 parameters of the basic model — these are d, c, a, b, Nn, Ns, nn0 ,
sn0 , w0, ϖ0, k0, M. For the baseline model, the following parameter val-
ues have been used, as stipulated by the experience of Russian pyra-
mids: Nn = 5000000, Ns = 1000000, (N = 6 million people), qn = qs =
0.001, d = 0.2 (thus, d/(1 + d) = 0.167), M = 300, k0 = 50000 (values in
thousand roubles, 1994 prices), w0=0.01, ϖ0=0.005. These numbers
seemingly make sense for large-scale pyramids. We tried also different
parameters to access comparative static effects as described below.
These values have been affected by the borders of confidence intervals
w0 and ϖ0: in particular, lowering of ϖ0 leads to a slight decrease in n*
and increase in k*. These are the main parameters that affected the
evolution of sophisticated I-strategists as shown in Fig. 2. These dynam-
ics have a single peak and decline to zero when the pyramid's lifetime
tends to infinity; however, since the game is terminating in finite time,
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Fig. 2. Dynamics of sophisticated investors (in the absence of
defection).
8×105
0
Sophisticated investors
basic dynamics
advertising dynamics with
b = 0.015 and 0.030
6×105
4×105
2×105
FINANCIAL PYRAMIDS IN TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES44
they will exhibit a break as shown in Fig. 3. These dynamics are not very
sensitive to parameter values: the lower (solid) line shows the pattern for
standard dynamics (20); the upper (dashed) line corresponds to an al-
ternative specification described below.
Not surprisingly, higher value of c leads to the lowering of n* and k*, and
also serves to extend the lifetime of the pyramid — in our estimations we
used c = 0.1. The dynamics of the pyramid's growth was also not sensi-
tive to the initial value of capital, implying that the modern Ponzis firm
might start with virtually no fixed costs, and that the confidence of the
public was the principal source of its success.
The main determinants of the dependence of these dynamics of time
are unobservable parameters a and b, which have had to be fitted.
Since all utilities are understood in the sense of Neumann–Morgen-
stern, i.e., defined up to affine transformations, the value of a is de-
prived of meaning — we set it equal to zero. By contrast, b is mean-
ingful: the higher it is, the higher are the chances that the individual,
observing the more profitable strategy of another player will find
it worthwhile to switch. One may also say that this parameter indi-
cates the elasticity of an individual's reaction across the population to
the observed performance of "the other guy" in an auxiliary game
(Table 3). Higher b implies this is very likely, for our baseline model
Sophisticated investors
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Fig. 3. Dynamics of sophisticated investors (with defection).
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b ∈ (0, 0.033) results in proper probabilistic dynamics of naive individu-
als as shown in Fig. 4. If the value of b is below 0.01, the population of
naive I-strategists initially grows, but then declines and is wiped out. At
middle levels of b at about 0.010 to 0.025, the dynamics of the share of
I-strategists reaches a steady state that depends on b; initially qI comes
to exceed this steady state, but gradually qI returns back to it from
above. At higher levels of b, the dynamics of naive I-strategists become
more volatile, and explode at values above 0.033. A vertical sum of the
dynamics of naive I-strategists for four alternative values of b (0.005,
0.015, 0.250 and 0.030) and for that of sophisticated individuals is
shown in Fig. 4.23 These patterns are typical, and clearly higher b leads
to greater and faster growth in the pyramid and higher k* as shown in
Fig. 5. It follows from the last two pictures that when b is higher, the
stopping time T is reached earlier: it varies normally between 4 and 8,
                                               
23 Symptomatically, nt with the lowest b = 0.005 follows the dynamics of sophisti-
cated individuals, which has a tendency to hold for naive individuals alone. This is
because naive individuals then switch from W to I with high caution, and if the
subpopulation of sophisticated individuals is not negligible, the number of such
switches will depend on what these latter are doing. In other words, with low b,
the mechanism of auto-reproduction of naive individuals on their own is not
"turned on."
All investors
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Fig. 4. Basic dynamics of I-strategists (naive and sophisticated).
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although under some combinations of parameters (c = 0.5, d = 0.1,
b = 0.005) it may extend to 12. Values of n* and k* are shown in Table 6
for the basic and other models.
Another interesting question is whether the composition of the population
(i.e. shares of naive and sophisticated individuals in N) matters. When
most subjects are sophisticated, the dynamics of the population closely
replicates that of their subpopulation (Fig. 3). Since naive individuals
mostly meet sophisticated ones, their subpopulation also follows the
same dynamics: symptomatically, the share of naive I-strategists reaches
its maximum at T. By contrast, a higher proportion of naive individuals
(Table 6: naive) returns the dynamics under which the share of naive in-
dividuals grows faster and sharper when b is larger. In other words, Pon-
zis manage to "extract" more money from naive individuals before the
collapse. Notice that the share of naive I-strategists for mid-valued b's
tends to some steady state. This implies that the population of investors
in a long-lived investment opportunity (like the Russian financial assets,
GKO) will tend to stabilize.
The main factor affecting the value of k* is M. The average size of a de-
posit allows one to attract much more money, and also tends (via repli-
cator dynamics) to extend the pyramid's lifetime (only two values are
shown in Table 6; higher values of b have to be ruled out because of a
lower instability threshold). Some data available suggest that the average
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Fig. 5. Basic dynamics of capital.
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amount of deposits in the Russian 1994 pyramids could be closer to
M = 700 than to M = 300; however, in this case the firm's task of finding
T is especially difficult even under deterministic dynamics of the pyra-
mids' growth. It follows from our analysis that the crucial factor of T's
Table 6. Characteristics of the pyramid at the optimal stopping time for different
parameter values.
Parameters
n*, thousand
people
k*, bln Rubles (1994 ã.) T
Basic, b = 0.005 533 87 6
Basic, b = 0.015 2419 266 8
Basic, b = 0.025 3668 706 8
Basic, b = 0.030 4867 887 9
Naive, b = 0.005 540 88 6
Naive, b = 0.015 2840 307 9
Naive, b = 0.025 4446 819 8
Naive, b = 0.030 5753 1078 8
Deposit, b = 0.005 1550 359 8
Deposit, b = 0.015 5530 1980 7
Interest low, b = 0.005 583 136 6
Interest low, b = 0.015 897 188 7
Interest low, b = 0.025 1900 353 8
Interest low, b = 0.030 2511 485 8
Interest high, b = 0.005 668 55 7
Interest high, b = 0.015 3699 367 8
Interest high, b = 0.025 5132 718 8
Advertising, b=0.015 3192 538 5
Advertising, b=0.030 4379 827 5
Specifications of the dynamics are as follows (see text for general description):
naive: basic + Nn = 5900000, Ns = 100000, N = 6000000;
deposit: basic + M = 700;
interest low: basic + d = 0.1;
interest high: basic + d = 0.3;
advertising: ξ = 0.6.
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estimation is the value of b, which itself is an unobservable psychological
characteristic of the population. Our model, however, reveals some of
these psychological characteristics: thus, as shown by Figs 4 and 5, the
full story of the pyramid is not necessarily over at the maximized value of
capital. The investors' population is predicted to decline only gradually
after the firm is unable to attract new deposits. Even after the firm is ru-
ined (kt < 0), the proportion of its naive investors does not immediately
drop to zero. This property of the replicator dynamics captures the fact
that it takes time for the population of naive individuals to accept the end
of their dream related to the pyramid.
On the firm's side, the natural aim is to try to predict and control pa-
rameter b. One natural mechanism for doing so is interest rate d whose
effects are also shown in Table 6. Lower values of d smooth the pyra-
mid's growth and increase the pyramid's lifetime with higher b, but dras-
tically decrease its size. Higher d induces faster growth in the gradual
outflow of I-strategists lead by cautious sophisticated investors until the
pyramid collapses; however, even in most profitable case of b = 0.025,
the value of k* is lower than in the basic case because of higher outlays.
Since very high levels of d will lead to explosive dynamics and may not
look trustworthy, average values of d (say, 10 to 20% over the market
rate) look optimal, and were indeed by far the most common in reality. In
both cases, smoothing of the dynamics occurs at a rather high cost; a
less expensive way to reach the same aim will be considered in the next
subsection.
B. Advertising campaign
The first obvious extension of the baseline model (20) consists of the use
of alternative stimuli, such as an advertising campaign. It seems natural
to suppose that the efficiency of this campaign (in terms of attracted de-
posits) declines with time, for N is finite. At the same time, one may want
the intensity of the campaign to depend on the current firm's resources.
We find it convenient to evaluate the efficiency of the campaign by the
share of those withholders at stage t – 1 who converted to investors at t.
Of the many possible evolutions of this share, consider the following dy-
namics:
)(
/)(]/)(exp[ 1211
t
kkkkkkt
q ttttttI Γ
−κ−κ
=∆ −−∗ , (21)
where κ1 and κ2 are parameters and Γ(t). Euler's gamma function is
used to normalize values of qI to the unit interval. The intuition behind
this specification is that the Ponzi managers agree to spend the fixed
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share κ1 of the last increment of capital. In such a case, the higher was
this increment in the last period, the higher will be the amount allocated
to advertising. Division by kt in (21) is again a matter of normalization,
corresponding also to the fact that the higher kt is, the lower are the
firm's incentive to advertise further. The cost of this campaign is then
κ1(kt – kt–1), but its efficiency will vary with parameter κ2: the higher it is,
the more efficient is the campaign. Altogether the dynamics (21) are
similar to a gamma distribution: it exhibits a sharp increase at first, and
an exponential decline afterwards. Lower (closer to 0) values of κ2
dampen these dynamics; in our estimations we have assumed that the
campaign was efficient, and set κ2 = 1. With κ1 = 0.2 and a = 0, (20) is
rewritten as
nt+1 – nt = 
s
t
n
t nn ∆+∆  =
= – nIq (1 – qI){b[u(eW, q) – u(eI, q)]}Nn +
+ (1 – nIq ){ξqIb[u(eI, q) – u(eW, q)] + (1 – ξ) ∗∆ Iq }Nn +
+ ∗∆ Iq (Ns –
s
tn ) max 



ϖ−
ϖ−+
tt
t
w
dd )1/(
,0 –
– stn [st + (1 – st)c]}. (22)
These advertising dynamics (in contrast to the basic dynamics, (20)) as-
sume that the inflow of the naive I-strategists is affected by two compo-
nents: the first of which (ξ ∈ [0, 1]) is due to the imitation of successful
behaviour as above; and the second (1 – ξ) is the result of advertising as
specified by (21). The same dynamics are substituted for the fraction of
sophisticated individuals whose dynamics are shown in dotted lines in
Fig. 3 for two values of b — 0.015 and 0.030. Symptomatically, both lines
are the same at the beginning, and only slightly decrease at the top of
the pyramid, corresponding to the fact that higher b incentives to adver-
tise decline, but only at higher values of kt.
The dynamic paths of (21) compared to (20) for these two values of b
are shown in Figs 2, 6, 7 and 8; see Table 6 for comparison of values of
n*, k* and T. At least three important tendencies are worth mentioning.
First, the peak of investors and capital is reached faster, by period 5,
which is synchronised for different values of b. Second, fluctuations of
capital for higher values of b are dampened, though not eliminated.
These two features imply that efficient advertising indeed helps to control
the dynamics of population strategies. Third, k* — the optimum value of
capital is higher than before for b = 0.015, but lower than before for
b = 0.030. This implies that advertising is efficient for the Ponzi firm if
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Fig. 6. Basic vs. advertising dynamics of naive investors.
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the elasticity of individuals' reactions to others' performance is quite low
(and advertising improves it) rather than when it is high (and advertising
just constitutes an extra cost).
C. Effects of nonlinear utilities
Another possible generalization of dynamics (20) arises if individuals
would maximize their expected utilities ∑u(x)px, or generalized expected
utilities ∑u(x)g(px), instead of expected value. In this broader class of
functionals, the rank-dependent utility models (Quiggin 1982; 1993; Yaari
1987; Wakker 1994) are the most natural candidates; however, the ef-
fects of such modification are straightforward. For, in either case, the
dynamics of the pyramid's growth will be dampened if individuals are
risk-averse, and have a concave utility function (in the case of expected
utility) or concave probability weighting function g (in rank-dependent
expected utility, in which case g's are capacities). We omit numerical
simulations of these effects, for they are pretty similar to those consid-
ered above, and we find it very difficult to suggest any specific nonlinear
transformation of the outcomes or probabilities that could be more
meaningful than the others.
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Fig. 8. Basic vs. advertising dynamics of capital.
basic dynamics,
b = 0.015
basic dynamics,
b = 0.030
advertising
dynamics,
b = 0.015
advertising
dynamics,
b = 0.030
FINANCIAL PYRAMIDS IN TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES52
D. A simpler derivation of replicator dynamics
It has been noticed before that a strategically minded sophisticated
I-strategist faces the stochastic control problem of a prohibitively com-
plicated structure. This suggests that (nearly) all individuals may have to
use some simple clues upon which reasonable individuals could condi-
tion their strategies. In view of this possibility, we now relax the naive-
sophisticated taxonomy in favour of an alternative rationality specifica-
tion. Assume that the behaviour of all members of a large population is
strategically indistinguishable, but on average all individuals approaching
the Ponzi game are 1) prudent, i.e. don't want to risk too much, and 2)
justify their strategies upon comparing it to other's behaviour, e.g.
through the mechanism of symmetric auxiliary game from Table 3. In this
section we construct an example of such behavioural motivation for the
particular case of the Ponzi game, which directly leads to a variant of the
replicator dynamics (6).
Consider again an auxiliary game from Table 3, and let the population
of N individuals be partitioned to I- and W-strategists in proportions qI
and 1 – qI, respectively, at any moment in time. In an auxiliary game,
a randomly drawn I-strategist will meet another I-strategist with probabil-
ity (Nn – qI Nn – 1)/(Nn – 1), and meet a W-strategist with probability
qI Nn/(Nn – 1). If N is sufficiently large, these quantities can be approxi-
mated by the current proportions of strategies I and W, 1 – qI and qI, re-
spectively. Further, we explicitly suppose that random matches of players
now happen in continuous time. Taking a sufficiently small time period,
the probability of having more than one individual learning within the
same time period may be considered as negligible (Samuelson, 1997), a
fact that allows us to concentrate on the expected outcome of a single
match.
An arbitrarily drawn individual can be either a current W-strategist (with
probability 1 – qI), or a current I-strategist (with probability qI). In the
former case, he will have no chance to change the strategy to I unless
he meets an I-strategist, which probability is given by qI — the current
fraction of I-strategists. In the case of this event, let the probability that a
W-strategist will desire to switch to strategy I be given by function ϕI:
u(eI, q) – u(eW, q) → [0, 1]. The domain of ϕI is the difference between
u(eI, q) and u(eW, q), so that he will switch from W to I if this difference
is positive (utilities may be allowed to be subject-specific, as in Section
5a, but their range must be given). The range of ϕI has to be [0, 1]; fur-
thermore, we assume it takes the simple form: ϕI = βu(eI, q) – αu(eW, q),
with properly selected coefficients α and β that bound ϕI to the unit inter-
val for every individual. These coefficients support the following inter-
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pretation: β captures the extent to which individuals react to the firm's
signals (e.g. high interest rate or advertising campaign), while α indicates
the intensity of individuals' regular market operations, which is propor-
tional to the individual's demand for money. Thus, the higher β is and the
lower α is, the more likely is the current withholder (one of N(1 – q)) to
invest in the firm once thought of this opportunity which thought is con-
ditional upon meeting a current I-strategist.
Thus the probability that an arbitrary W-strategist will switch and invest,
or the expected injection to strategy I, is given by
(1–qI)qI [βu(eI, q) – αu(eW, q)]. (23)
The expected leakage from this strategy applies to current I-strategists
only. We assume they switch to withhold unconditionally upon meeting a
withholder for two basic reasons. First, they may simply need money for
regular transaction purposes, which is more likely the higher is coeffi-
cient α. This necessity is counterbalanced by higher incentives to keep
money in the firm, as captured by β. Withdrawal of a current deposit can
then be captured by αu(eI, q) – βu(eI, q), which also should have its
range in [0, 1]. This would obviously require α > β; moreover, it must be
coordinated with the use of these coefficients in (21).
A final component allows us to take into account the individual's precau-
tion when investing into the financial pyramid. One way to capture this is
to stipulate that when the proportion of the population currently playing I
is high, the subject is more likely to be afraid of its collapse, and thus will
tend to withhold. This caution, then, may be measured by the fraction of
current I-strategists qI. Altogether, the probability that a single individual
plays I and will switch to W is
qIqI [αu(eI, q) – βu(eI, q)], (24)
and the expected increment of I-strategists is then approximated by the
difference between (21) and (22), namely,
(1–qI)qI [βu(eI, q) – αu(eW, q)] – qIqI [αu(eI, q) – βu(eI, q)]. (25)
Rearranging this,
(1–qI)qIβu(eI, q) – (1–qI)qIαu(eW, q) – qIqIαu(eI, q) +
+ qIqIβu(eI, q) = qI [(1 – qI)βu(eI, q) + qIβu(eI, q) –
– (1 – qI)αu(eW, q) – qIαu(eI, q)] = qI [βu(eI, q) – αu(q, q)], (26)
We obtain a replicator dynamics equation with parameters β and α. The
specification just described requires the population to be homogeneous
(or deals with the  populations' averages), but it also has the advantage
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of allowing a separated analysis of four factors' effects: probability of
defection; utilities of various outcomes; liquidity preference α; and elas-
ticity of deposits on incentives β. With the same parameter values as
above, we were able to obtain appropriate coefficients α and β with
ranges (1/6, 1/3) and (0, 1/6), respectively, and an additional condition
that the difference between particular values assumed by α and β is less
than 1/6. With these parameters, the function ϕI meets the requirements
made above, and we obtain dynamics (24) which, with zero probability of
the firm's defection, closely repeats those with mid-valued parameter b
for model (20), but with more distant satiation (see Figs 9 and 10, where
α = 0.25, β = 0.15, inflow component in (23) amounts to 0.9 and outflow
in (24) amounts to 0.6. Collapse of the pyramid again occurs, but later
than in the basic case.
7. CONCLUSION
The issues discussed in this paper are pertinent to the puzzling and im-
portant phenomenon of transitional economies — that of financial pyra-
mids. We found that, despite some features common to standard games,
such as reputation and rationalizability, they are essentially disequilibrium
phenomena. We have shown that this game has no (nontrivial) equilib-
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Fig. 9. Alternative I-strategists dynamics.
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rium, and that any cautious strategy may be successful only if by chance
and at the expense of other fellow individuals. Symptomatically, this
strategy also cannot be justified on the grounds of the rule of long-run
success in the sense that were the individual invest in a sufficient num-
ber of pyramids whilst these were growing, he or she would benefit on
average. A fallacy of this type of argument has been unveiled by Sa-
muelson (1963), who has shown that no expected-utility maximizing indi-
vidual should accept a sequence of equivalent fair gambles if she rejects
a single game of the same kind. Accordingly, if no optimal rules based
on the principle of expected-utility (or expected-value) maximization exist
for a single pyramid, no such rules can be designed for a diversified
strategy either.24 Finally, in reality there is no guarantee that the firm
would be rational enough to follow its optimal policy; a single "tremble"
would destroy any equilibrium calculations of the smartest of the indi-
viduals. It follows from this paper that the real worth of investing in the
Ponzi firm is rather like a casino bet using a random device with chances
that are only known to be unfair, the only difference being that the out-
come is revealed faster in this latter case.
The only meaningful advice to the individuals who want to be called 'ra-
tional' and think of playing Ponzi games is thus not to mess with them;
                                               
24 This result, however, is not valid for a broad class of generalized EUT function-
als (Segal and Spivak, 1988).
Capital
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Fig. 10. Alternative capital dynamics.
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nevertheless, in reality many did. This raises the following, natural ques-
tions: 1) which economic circumstances have created incentives for
them to do so, paving the way for the pyramids' growth; and 2) how did
the market for savings evolve after having experienced Ponzi games, and
in particular, what did this experience teach them. We find it likely that
the instruments proposed and used in this paper shall be helpful in ad-
dressing these questions within the framework of multi-stage signalling
games, which leads to the construction of appropriate population dy-
namics. These tasks are left for the future work.
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Proof of Propositions 1 and 1a
We consider the evolution of a subpopulation of I-strategists as a homo-
geneous Markov chain with finite state space S and a given stochastic
matrix of ρs's, t+1. Given the finiteness of the set of all possible histories,
{kt} is a sequence of well-defined random variables — values of capital
at each time period. Values of kt for different histories may coincide, re-
flecting the fact that it doesn't matter for the firm which particular indi-
vidual has played W or I at every t; however, for every history there cor-
responds a unique sequence {kt}. It suffices, therefore, to limit our
attention to payoff-relevant histories, i.e., to those partitions of Ht that
are equivalent from the viewpoint of the firm's payoffs (Fudenberg and
Tirole, 1991, ch.13). The firm's task is to find the Markov moment t*25 for
the process {kt} (The Markov moment is called stopping time T if t* is
reached in finite time with probability 1.).
Consider first the case of a unit discount rate and a risk-neutral capital
maximizing firm whose task it is to find stopping time T (i.e., set t* = T)
for the value of t that solves
max En(t) [ ]





−∆−


−∆+∑
−
=
−
MdnMnMdnMnk tttt
T
t
t
1
1
1 ; (A1)
Here, expectation is to be taken at the beginning of every period and is
conditional upon the firm's sufficient statistic hN+1, t, which may lead to a
large variety of particular solutions. At stopping time T, the expected in-
crement of capital ∆nTM should be lower than the interest payments due,
nTMd, so that the whole expression in the second square bracket should
be negative. This expression will represent the firm's foregone cost when
defecting at T. Using the Bellman optimality principle, at any prior-to-last
stage it is optimal to maximize the sum of expected value of capital at
the current stage and expected value of capital at all subsequent stages,
provided the optimal policy is used at all stages. Let Vt denote the maxi-
mum value of capital at every period: thus, VT is the maximum value of
                                               
25 The Markov moment is a random variable t* defined with respect to a nonde-
creasing sequence of algebras whenever the set {t* ≤ t} is measurable for every t.
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capital (2) at the last stage T, VT–1 is its maximum value at T–1:
VT–1(kT–1) = max En(T–1){[kT–2 + ∆nT–1M – nT–1Md]}, (A2)
and so forth. By the responsiveness condition and the definition of stop-
ping time, T – 1 is the last moment when it is optimal to play C; in the
next period T, the firm should stop the Ponzi game by defecting. Pro-
ceeding backward and making use of additive separability,
VT–2(kT–2) = max En(T–2){kT–3 + ∆nT–2M – nT–2Md]} +
+ max En(T–2){VT–1[kT–1]} =
= max En(T–2){kT–3 + ∆nT–2M – nT–2Md] +
+ VT–1[kT–2 + ∆nT–1M – nT–1Md]}, (A3)
since kT–1 = kT–2 + ∆nT–1M – nT–1Md, and the optimal value VT–1 should
be added to any value of kT–1 at T–1. By responsiveness, the optimal
decision at stage T – 2 is to cooperate as well. Continuing recursively
backward, we see that the same strategy will ensure that Vt is an optimal
value of capital for period t and all subsequent periods t + 1, ..., T due to
the enforcement of the optimality principle. It is easy to see that the
specification of Proposition 1a does nothing but removes some ambigu-
ity concerning the stopping time: if the dynamics of investors are mono-
tonic, the firm simply monitors their inflow, and defects as long as it no-
tices the inflow of new investment weakening.
Returning now to a more general case, we relax the assumptions of risk
neutrality and of no discounting. This will lead to the specification
max En(t)uN+1[ ∑
−
=
−
−δ
1
1
1
1
T
t
t
t k +∆ntM–ntMd ] – EnuN+1[∆nTM – nTMd], (A4)
where uN+1(.) is the firm's utility function for money, and δ is the dis-
count factor applied to the capital of the forthcoming periods. This func-
tional form, in particular, emphasises the fact that most of the modern
Ponzis wanted to accumulate money not for any productive activities
within the economy, but just for their own consumption. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
For reader's convenience, recall that an equilibrium profile q is called.
• (Trembling-hand) perfect if there exists {qi} — a sequence of com-
pletely mixed strategies converging to q in the strategies' space, s.t.
u? (q?,
iq ?− ) ≥ u? (e?, 
iq ?− ), ∀?, ∀e? ∈ Q? (spanning over the set of pure
strategies, e? is sufficient). An alternative formulation of the perfection
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of q (due to Myerson) requires profile q to be any limit (with ε → 0) of
"ε-perfect" equilibrium profiles of completely mixed strategies qε s.t.
u? (e?,
iq ?− ) < u? ( ?e′ ,
iq ?− ) ⇒ 
ε
?q (e?) < ε.
• Proper if it is a limit of any "ε-proper" equilibrium profile qε of comple-
tely mixed strategies s.t. u? (e?,
ε
−?q ) < u? ( ?e′ ,
iq ?− ) ⇒ 
ε
?q (e?) < ε
ε
?q (e?).
• Essential if ∀ε > 0 ∃η > 0 s.t. for all games u'(q) perturbed about u(q)
with payoffs no more distant than η, there exists an equilibrium profile
q' which is no more distant from q than ε (all distances being meas-
ured with respect to the standard Euclidean metric).
• Sequential (based on an extensive form) if it is sequentially rational,
i.e., (a subject and verb is missing here or "expected" utility is maxi-
mized...) expected utility-maximising for all players, given their poste-
rior beliefs and reached information sets; and consistent, i.e., there is
a limit of some sequence of completely mixed strategies and poste-
rior beliefs updated whenever possible by the Bayes rule.
• Stable (set-valued notion) if this equilibrium set is closed and mini-
mal with respect to the following property: ∀η > 0 ∃ε > 0 s.t. ∀ε' < ε;
any profile of completely mixed strategies ε'(e?) (denoting the maxi-
mum allowable trembles for all players and strategies), has an equi-
librium within η of that set (in the set of strategies).
For a comprehensive discussion of these and other refinements, see van
Damme (1991). (Note that application of these refinements to our case
require a continuum approximation of payoffs of the game from Table 1.)
Proof: In a stage-truncated game from Table 2, the firm's pure strategies
C and D can be dominant for appropriate types, and the dominance is
not upset by a single individual's tremble to W or I (this assumption is
not crucial for the following proofs). To show that the equilibrium com-
ponent with the firm's strategies +θt C will contain trembling-hand perfect
equilibria, take any of these and consider a decreasing sequence of
trembles in completely mixed strategies with cumulative probabilities of
playing defective strategies below ε = 1 – [1/(1 + d)] = d/(1 + d). When
probabilities of such trembles are below ε, I is the best response for the
individual. Conversely, any sequence of completely mixed strategies with
a cumulative probability of tremble to C below ε' = 1/(1+d) will result in
trembling-hand perfection of equilibria in ( −θt D, W).26 Properness too
                                               
26 Note, however, that the tremble's "allowance" is much higher in the (C, I) than
in the (D, W) case. Both cases also directly follow from the fact that none of these
equilibrium strategies are weakly dominated under their corresponding conditions.
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follows from a similar argument, but requires smaller probabilities of dis-
equilibrium trembles, together with finite disutility of –M and finite utility
of dM for equilibria in I and W, respectively. Limiting the above argument
to a sufficiently small closed subset of each equilibrium component, to-
gether with sufficiently small trembles, would return the stable set. For
any ε-perturbation of mixed strategies there will be a bounded perturba-
tion of payoffs that will preserve fixed points of best-reply correspon-
dences within given ε, which is essential. Finally, the sequentiality is di-
rectly implied by perfection for any extensive form corresponding to the
normal form from Table 2. Furthermore, applying the same reasoning of
a +θt C component to a collection of several truncated games based on
γt, perfectness and sequentiality will hold for these profiles over a num-
ber of periods (we do not state this observation as a separate proposi-
tion). Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 4
The required universal belief space under construction is conceived as a
sequence of spaces Ω1, Ω2, ... for the stage-games at periods t = 0, 1, ...
along the lines of Brandenburger and Dekel (1993), whose approach is
somewhat simpler than that of Mertens and Zamir, and makes explicit use
of the Kolmogorov extension theorem. We construct a complete type
space for the initial stage-game γ0 of the game Γ, followed by the gradual
"removal" of those events that did not occur by each consecutive time
period. Assume that the firm's capital takes values on some bounded sub-
set of the positive half of the real line, denoted by K0, and that the original
strategy of the population of individuals is characterized by parameter
vector W0. The set of all values of K0×W0 is assumed to be a compact27
Polish (non-empty, complete, separable metric) space. Since the strate-
gies' space is fixed and known, and since payoffs to every individual player
are the same across stages, denoted by I = {Md, M, 0}, we observe that
the space of possible "states" of the game γ0 is
K0 × W0 ×∏
=
N
I
1?
?
— a compact Polish space.
                                               
27 The compactness assumption is hardly too strong in this context, for the set of
the firm's possible strategies is finite (|Q| = 2), the population is finite, and pos-
sible values of the firm's capital are bounded from above from all individuals'
viewpoints. Compactifying these spaces if necessary, their N + 1 product is com-
pact by Tikhonov's theorem.
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Introducing now the time dimension, notice that since the population is
finite, and individuals' payoffs are the same throughout the game Γ, for
all t < ∞ the product
× ∞
=0t (Kt × Wt ×∏
=
N
I
1?
? )
will be the space of "physical uncertainty", also compact Polish by con-
struction. This last space of all possible histories of play in the game Γ is
still too large; to ensure its inner consistency, attention should be limited
to its subspace satisfying the following structural condition: for every pe-
riod t,
Kt+1 × Wt+1 ×∏
=
N
I
1?
? = ρs's, t[(K t× Wt × ∏
=
N
I
1?
? ) × qt]
for all functions ρ(.) corresponding to every point in
Kt × Wt ×∏
=
N
I
1?
?
and every qt. (Note that in view of the finiteness of possible profiles, the
transition functions ρ are always measurable and well-defined.) The se-
quence of these subsets indexed with t, { 0tB } is a subspace of the
"physical uncertainty" space we shall be dealing with.
For any stage-game t, P( 0tB ) is the set of all probability measures on
0
tB  endowed with a weak topology, which is just sufficient to guarantee
that any sequence of probability measures converges to some probability
measure if and only if ∫∫ → dpfdpf n  for every bounded continuous
function f defined on 0tB . The set P(
0
tB ) is also a compact and Polish
space; it encompasses all beliefs held at stage t by all N individuals and
the firm. The Cartesian product of these belief spaces for all individuals,
1
tB  ≡ 
0
tB ×∏
=
N
tBP
1
0)(
?
? ,
is called the 1-level space,28 and its points are 1-level beliefs, defined as
                                               
28 In our specific case, both the firm and all individuals are uncertain about point
W0, and all individuals, in addition, about point K0. However, at level 
1
tB , both of
these uncertainties become valid to every player. For notational simplicity we use
the general format at the outset.
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)( 111 ttt BP??? ≡Θ∈θ .Proceeding inductively for the spaces of levels
n = 2, 3, ...,
∏
=
−− ×=
N
n
t
n
t
n
t BPBB
1
11 )(
?
? , ...,
we obtain every n-level belief space as the product of individual beliefs
over ,1−ntB  denoted as




× ∏
+
=
−−
1
1
11 )(
N
n
t
n
t BPBP
?
? .
A type θ?t ∈ Θ?t ≡ P? ( ∞tB ) of every player is just this infinite hierarchy of
beliefs — a point in the




Θ× ∏
+
=
∞
=
×
1
11
0 )(
N
n
t
n
tB
?
?
space.
Call the type θ?t = { ...,,, 321 ttt ??? θθθ } ∈ Θ?t coherent if the marginal distribu-
tion of ntθ  on the space 2−ntB  coincides with a marginal distribution of
1−θnt  on 2−θnt  for all levels n > 0 and n – 1. This condition requires that
individuals' beliefs about the true physical state and/or types of his op-
ponents of previous levels do not change at any higher level. Since not
all beliefs are necessarily coherent, this restriction bites, limiting atten-
tion to a (clearly compact) subset of




Θ× ∏
+
=
∞
=
×
1
11
0 )(
N
n
t
n
tB
?
?  ≡ t?Θ ;
note that by construction it incorporates all possible future paths of the
game.
By the standard result from the probability theory, the coherence condi-
tion as formulated above is necessary and sufficient for the Kolmogorov
extension theorem for the (?∞, ?0(?∞)) space (and for the stochastic
process29). By the coherence property, there exists a surjective map
                                               
29 For this representation, it actually suffices to assume that the coordinate
spaces are Polish, or even just any measurable spaces, by the Ionescu Tulcea
theorem (see Shiryayev, 1984, p. 247).
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from the set of all finite subsets of Θ?t to the set of cylinders in








Θ× ∏
+
=
∞
=
×
1
11
0 )(
N
n
t
n
tBP
?
? ;
by weak convergence of measures, this map and its inverse are both
continuous, and thus the map
f(θ?t): 







Θ×→Θ ∏×
+
=
∞
=
1
11
0 )(
N
n
t
n
tt BP
?
??
is a homeomorphism (see Brandenburger and Dekel, 1993, for detailed
proof). However, this is not yet sufficient to ensure consistency of indi-
vidual beliefs over beliefs of other players. For instance, it does not ex-
clude the possibility that one of the players will act assuming the oppo-
nents are irrational. In equilibrium, this possibility is to be ruled out,
which may be done in a number of ways. One way consists of defining a
point of Ωt — the universal belief space of γ0, — as the limit of beliefs
held by coherent individuals (as done by Mertens and Zamir, 1985). An-
other way is by requiring other players' rationality to be common knowl-
edge (as in Brandenburger and Dekel, 1993). Under this last assump-
tion, attention has to be limited to a proper subset Ωt of




Θ× ∏
+
=
∞
=
×
1
11
0 )(
N
n
t
n
tB
?
? ,
which satisfies both the coherence and common knowledge restrictions.
This latter definition is easier and compatible with the general logic of
our model; thus, we call
Ωt ⊂ 



Θ× ∏
+
=
∞
=
×
1
11
0 )(
N
n
t
n
tB
?
? ,
the universal belief space of the game γt. The Borel σ-algebra over that
set shall be denoted by ?t Showing that Ωt ∼ hmeoP(Ωt) ≡ Θt, where Θt
is the universal types space is also straightforward (Brandenburger
and Dekel, 1993). Indeed, common knowledge implies that Θt is a set
of all θ?t s.t.
1)(
1
11
0
)( =







Θ× ∏
+
=
∞
=
θ ×
N
n
t
n
tt Bf
?
?? ,
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thus for every such θ?t, f(θ?t) is the set of elements of








Θ× ∏
+
=
∞
=
×
1
11
0 )(
N
n
t
n
tBP
?
? ,
for which the probability of event ( ) 10 +Ω× NttB
equals one. But this last set is homeomorphic to Θt as the set of degen-
erate measures on a subspace of a metrizable space. This completes
the construction of the universal belief and types spaces for the initial
stage-game γ0.
Now we need to account for the dynamic aspect of the Ponzi game. This
can be done if we notice that the universal belief space Ωt contains all
possible paths of the games γt, t = 0, 1, 2, ..., where the observable part
of a profile qt "cuts off" those paths (subsets of Ωt) that are known to
not be played at each time period. These paths are exactly those which
correspond to commonly known information that the firm did not defect
at stage t. One may say that every move of the firm partitions the set of
possible paths of the Ponzi game into two parts, corresponding to its
cooperation or defection. This underlies the following construction of the
conditional probabilities µ(Ht+1|Gt) of any possible event (set of paths)
Ht+1 ⊂ ?t with respect to any possible event Gt ⊂ Ht+1, which is known to
contain (or not) the actual strategy qtN+1 played at t.
Every observed history observed at t forms a partition ?t = {Gt, ¬Gt} of
Ωt; let the subset Gt of Ωt correspond to the firm's cooperation at t. Then
for any random variable µt+1 on Ωt for which a mathematical expectation
is defined, the expected value of µt+1 on Gt is also defined as
∫ ωµωµ +
)(
1 )()(
tG
tt d , ω ∈ Gt.
This last expectation is countably additive, and thus is itself a measure,
denoted by νt and clearly, absolutely continuous with respect to µt: if
µt(ω) = 0 then νt(ω) = 0. By the Radon–Nikodym theorem, we can write
∫ ωµωµ +
)(
1 )()(
tG
tt d  = νt(Gt) = µt(Ht+1∩Gt),
where µt+1(.) is an (?t/?t) — measurable function. When µt+1 is an indi-
cator function of the set Ht+1, it is a version of conditional probability;30
                                               
30 This was also discussed by Mertens and Zamir, who have shown that consis-
tency of players' beliefs (in the sense that for every subset A of Ωt and every t,
∫
Ω∈ω
µ=µ tt A)( (A|Gt)dµt(Gt)) is tantamount to saying they are Bayesians.
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notably, its definition up to the set of measure 0 corresponds to the fact
that it is approximately independent of the strategy of any single individ-
ual. The system Gt ∩ ?t is itself a σ-algebra over a smaller belief space
Ωt+1 ⊂ Ωt. Continuing iteratively, we obtain a decreasing sequence of be-
lief subspaces Ω0 ⊃ Ω1 ⊃ Ω2 ⊃ ..., all of which are compact Polish and
serve as universal belief spaces for the corresponding stage games.
Building an extension for the continuation game to the next stage-game
given the above sequence of  universal belief spaces still remains to be
done. This can be achieved if we restrict attention to those subsets of Ωt
that are not precluded by history h?t, and introduce a Borel σ-algebra
?t+1 on Ωt+1. As shown above, in period t + 1 each individual player ?
should select a (pure) strategy that maximizes his or her payoff at that
stage;
e?, t+1 ∈ argmax ∫
−
θ
+
?
? 1, tu [e?, t+1, q–?, t+1, s|θ, h?t] µ?t+1(dθ–?, s|h?t), (A5)
where µ?t+1 and h?t are his or her beliefs at t + 1 and information vector
at t, and qt+1 = (q?, t+1 qN+1, t+1) is the profile to be played in the up-
coming stage. A corresponding problem for the firm is written as stipu-
lated in Section 3:
eN+1, t+1 ∈ argmax ∫
−
θ
++
?
1,1 tNu [eN+1,t+1, q–?,t+1, s|θ, hN+1, t] ×
× µN+1,t+1(dθ–?, s|θN+1, hN+1, t). (A6)
Note that our setup allows us to avoid conditioning this optimization
problem on the expected strategies of every other player: all information
is contained in the aggregates. Rules (5a) and (6a) determine those
policies of player ? that are not precluded by the profile qt played at any
point of time. A Cartesian product of policies compatible with the history
of plays is essentially a (closed) subset of Ωt, and it is made compatible
by construction with the transition function ρs's, t(.) for every t. By induc-
tion, a required sequence of types {Θt}, physical uncertainty {Bt}, and
universal belief spaces Ωt that are a compact and Polish space, endowed
with σ-algebras {?t} is then obtained, and each member of this se-
quence indexed by t represents beliefs and physical uncertainty at that
stage game. These sequences potentially extend to infinity, although in
practice they are interrupted by the first defection of the firm. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5
Suppose that one (individual) player, observing h?t at t, excludes the
set ¬Gt, and another (individual) player observes h'?t≠h?t and excludes
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¬G't ≠ ¬Gt. At the next stage, systems Gt ∩ ?t and tG′  ∩ ?t will then be
different, generating different belief spaces Ωt+1 and 1+Ω′t , and in par-
ticular, different physical uncertainty spaces B1. Taking ∪N+1?B1? as the
basic derived space would not help, for then beliefs of player ? are unde-
fined over those points of that space which do not belong to the support
of his or her type θ?1 — in other words, the types will fail to be coherent.
REFERENCES 67
REFERENCES
Abalkin L.I. (1997) Communication at a seminar by V.M.Polterovich on "The Crisis
of Economic Theory" (Moscow, CEMI)
Akerlof G. (1970) Market for "lemons": quality uncertainty and the market mecha-
nism, Quarterly Journal of Economics 89, 488–500
Arthur W.B. (1993) On designing economic agents that behave like human agents,
Journal of Evolutionary Economics 3, 1–22
Banerjee A. (1992) A simple model of herd behaviour, Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 107, No. 3, 797–817
Belianin A.V. (1998) Risk attitudes and choice under uncertainty: experimental
evidence from Russia (Moscow: EERC working paper)
Bertocchi G. and Y. Wang (1995) The real value of money under endogenous be-
liefs, Journal of Economic Theory 67, 205–232
Bertsekas D. (1976) Dynamic programming and stochastic control (New York:
Academic Press)
Bhattacharya S. and B.L. Lipman (1995) Ex Ante versus Interim Rationality and the
Existence of Bubbles, Economic Theory 6, No. 3, 469–494
Bhttacharya U. (1999) On the possibility of Ponzi schemes in transitional econo-
mies (Mimeo, University of Indiana)
Bikhchandani S., D. Hirshleifer, and I. Welch (1992) A theory of fads, fashion,
custom, and cultural-change as informational cascades, Journal of Political Econ-
omy 100, No. 5, 992–1026
Bjornerstedt J. and J. Weibull (1995) Nash equilibrium and evolution by imitation,
in: K. Arrow et al., eds., The rational foundations of economic behaviour
(London: Macmillan)
Blackwell D. (1965) Discounted dynamic programming, Annals of Mathematical
Statistics 36, 226–235
Blanchard O.-J. and M. Watson (1982) Bubbles, rational expectations and
financial markets, in: P. Wachtel, ed., Crises in the economic and financial struc-
ture (Lexington, Massachusetts)
Borgers T. and R. Sarin (1977) Learning through reinforcement and the replicator
dynamics, Journal of Economic Theory 77, No. 1, 1–14
Boylan R.T. (1995) Continuous approximations of dynamical systems with ran-
domly matched individuals, Journal of Economic Theory 66, 615–625
Boylan R.T. (1992) Law of large numbers for dynamical systems with randomly
matched individuals, Journal of Economic Theory 57, 473–504
Brandenburger A. and E. Dekel (1993) Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowl-
edge, Journal of Economic Theory 59, 189–198
FINANCIAL PYRAMIDS IN TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES68
Chakrabarti S.K. (1999) Markov equilibria in discounted stochastic games, Journal
of Economic Theory 85, 294–327
Cozzi G. (1998) Culture as a bubble, Journal of Political Economy 106, No. 2,
376–394.
Denardo E.V. (1967) Contraction mappings in the theory underlying dynamic pro-
gramming, SIAM Review 9, 165–177
Duffie D., J. Geanakoplos, A. Mas-Colell, and A. McLennan (1994) Stationary
Markov equilibria, Econometrica 62, 745–781
Epstein L. and T. Wang (1996) Beliefs about beliefs without probabilities,
Econometrica 64, No. 6, 1343–1374
Forslid R. (1998) External debt and Ponzi-games in a small open economy with
endogenous growth, Journal of Macroeconomics 20, No. 2, 341–349
Froot K.A. and M. Obstfeld (1991) Intrinsic bubbles — the case of stock-prices,
American Economic Review 81, No. 5, 1189–1214
Friedman J. (1989) Game theory with applications to economics (New York: Ox-
ford University Press)
Fudenberg D. and J. Tirole (1991) Game theory (Cambridge (MA): MIT Press)
Fukuta Y. (1998) A simple discrete-time approximation of continuous-time bub-
bles, Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 22, No. 6, 937–954
Gaddy D. and Ickes B. (1998) Beyond the bailout: time to face reality about Rus-
sia's "virtual economy" (Mimeo, Brookings Institutions)
Gilles C. and S.F. LeRoy (1997) Bubbles as payoffs at infinity, Economic Theory 9,
No. 2, 261–281
Goldberg M.D. and R. Frydman (1996) Imperfect knowledge and the behaviour of
foreign exchange market, Economic Journal 106, 869–894
Harsanyi J. (1967) Games with incomplete information played by Bayesian play-
ers, Management Science, 159–182.
Harsanyi J. and R. Selten (1988) A general theory of equilibrium selection in
games (Cambridge (MA): MIT Press)
Kachelmeier S.J. and M. Shehata (1992) Examining risk preferences under high
monetary incentives: experimental evidence from the People's Republic of China,
American Economic Review 82, 1120–1141
Kahneman D. and A. Tversky (1979) Prospect theory: an analysis of decision un-
der risk, Econometrica 47, 263–291
King I. and D. (1993) Ferguson Dynamic inefficiency, endogenous growth, and
Ponzi games, Journal of Monetary Economics 32, No. 1, 79–104
Kushner H. (1971) Introduction to stochastic control (New York: Holt)
Levine D. (1995) Remarks on evolution and learning (Mimeo, UCLA)
Maynard, Smith J. (1882) Evolution and the theory of games (Cambridge: CUP).
REFERENCES 69
Mertens J.-F. and T. Parthasarathy (1987) Equilibria in discounted stochastic
games (CORE, Universite catholique de Louvain, Research paper 8750)
Mertens J.-F. and S. Zamir (1985) Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games
with incomplete information, International Journal of Game Theory, 1–29
Nowak A.S. (1985) Existence of equilibrium stationary strategies in discounted
non-cooperative stochastic games with uncountable state space, Journal of Opti-
mization Theory 45, 591–602
O'Connell S.A. and S.P. Zeldes (1988) Rational Ponzi Games, International Eco-
nomic Review 29, No. 3, 431–450
Orlean A. (1994) Analysis of influence phenomena — from social and cognitive
psychology to financial economics, Revue Economique 45, No. 3, 657–672
Parthasarathy T. (1982) Existence of equilibrium stationary strategies in dis-
counted stochastic games, Sankya 44, 114–127
Parthasarathy T. and S. Sinha (1989) Existence of stationary equilibrium strategies
in nonzero-sum discounted stochastic games with uncountable state space and
state independent transitions, International Journal of Game Theory 18, 189–194
Porter D.P. and V.L. Smith (1995) Futures contracting and dividend uncertainty in
experimental asset markets, Journal of Business 68, No. 4, 509–541
Quiggin J. (1982) A theory of anticipated utility, Journal of Economic Behaviour
and Organization 3, No. 4, 323–343
Quiggin J. (1993) Generalized expected utility theory: the rank-dependent model
(Boston: Kluwer)
Reidel U. (1979) Equilibrium plans for nonzero-sum Markov games,
in: O. Moeschlin and D. Pallasche, eds., Game theory and related topics (Amster-
dam: North-Holland)
Rosser J. (1991) From catastrophe to chaos: a general theory of economic dis-
continuities (Boston: Kluwer)
Samuelson L. (1997) Evolutionary games and equilibrium selection (Cambridge:
MIT Press)
Schlag K. (1998) Why imitate, and if so, how?, Journal of Economic Theory 78,
130–156
Segal U. and A. Spivak (1988) Non-expected utility risk premiums: the cases of
probability ambiguity and outcome uncertainty, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 1,
333–347
Selten R. (1975) Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points
in extensive-form games, International Journal of Game Theory 4, 25–55
Shapley L. (1953) Stochastic games, Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences 39, 1095–1100
Shiryayev, A.N. (1984) Probability (Springer, New York) (2nd ed.: Moscow: Nauka,
1989, in Russian).
FINANCIAL PYRAMIDS IN TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES70
Simon H.A. (1955) A behavioural model of rational choice, Quarterly Journal of
Economics 69, 99–118
Simon H.A. (1978) Rationality as a process and as product of thought, American
Economic Review 68, No. 2, 1–16
Sobel M.J. (1971) Noncooperative stochastic games, Annals of Mathematical Sta-
tistics 42, 1930–1935
Taylor P. and L. Jonker (1978) Evolutionary stable strategies and game dynamics,
Mathematical Biosciences 40, 145–156
Tirole J. (1982) On the possibility of speculation under rational expectation,
Econometrica 50, No. 5, 1169–1181
Tirole J. (1985) Asset bubbles and overlapping generations, Econometrica 53,
No. 5, 1071–1110
van Damme E. (1991) Stability and perfection of Nash equilibria (Berlin: Springer)
Wakker P.P. (1994) Separating marginal utility and probabilistic risk aversion,
Theory and Decision 36, 1–44
Weibull J. (1995) Evolutionary game theory (Cambridge: MIT Press)
Weil P. (1987) Confidence and the real value of money in overlapping generation
models, Quarterly Journal of Economics 102, No. 1, 1–22
Werner J. (1997) Arbitrage, bubbles, and valuation, International Economic Review
38, No. 2, 453–464
Whittaker D.H. and Y. Kurosawa (1998) Japan's crisis: evolution and implications,
Cambridge Journal of Economics 22, No. 6, 761–771
Wu Y.R. (1997) Rational bubbles in the stock market: Accounting for the US
stock-price volatility, Economic Inquiry 35, No. 2, 309–319
Yaari M.E. (1987) The dual theory of choice under risk, Econometrica 55, No. 1,
95–115
